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ABSTRACT
Bostic, Sarah E. M.Hum. Master of Humanities Graduate Program, Wright State
University, 2019. Classism, Ableism, and the Rise of Epistemic Injustice Against White,
Working-Class Men.

In this thesis, I set out to illustrate how epistemic injustice functions in this divide
between white working-class men and the educated elite. I do this by discussing the
discursive ways in which working-class knowledge and experience are devalued as
legitimate sources of knowledge. I demonstrate this by using critical discourse analysis to
interpret the underlying attitudes and ideologies in comments made by Clinton and
Trump during their 2016 presidential campaigns. I also discuss how these ideologies are
positively or negatively perceived by Trump’s working-class base. Using feminist
standpoint theory and phenomenology as a lens of interpretation, I argue that white
working-class men are increasingly alienated from progressive politics through classist
and ableist rhetoric. If progressives wish to win over white working-class men, they will
need to ameliorate this division, otherwise this gap will continue to grow. Finally, I
suggest class-sensitive approaches for moving forward and bridging this gap.
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CHAPTER 1:
THE CULTURAL AND POLITICAL GAP
Entry to university ushers a break with the fabric of the world, and we are invited,
if we are to hope for success to beckon with its elegant fingers, to come to feel a
repulsion to the politics of the poor. Reality gets lost in the race for the hypercoherence of politically correct opinion and the games of good-conscience that
are the dominant motif of the conversations of radical intellectuals . . . The
embodied ethics of a silent group, unrepresented in the spaces of delicate
discussion, are never recognized, nor are the racism and intolerance, the deep
processes of abjection and uglification that are the very condition of the
experience of elite university-space that the bourgeois across the world are
willing to pay so much for. There is little that one can say . . . of the petty grandnarratives that pass so much muster among the radical intelligentsia . . . gaining
huge symbolic rewards for what amounts to a social parody obscuring the grounds
of their own privilege . . . [Too] much of their radical agenda . . . amounts to a
stigmatizing of some of the most powerless sections of society and ends in the
. . . exclusion of those already excluded. (Charlesworth 154-155)

OVERVIEW
The purpose of this opening chapter is to join the conversation on the cultural and
political gap between the educated elite and the white working-class. This chapter has
three major goals. The first is to introduce the topic, the premise to my argument, and the
concepts I use to support my argument. The second is to provide a literature review that
gives the reader a sufficient background for the topic. The third is to describe the format
1

that this paper will follow.

INTRODUCTION
Leading up to and following the 2016 presidential election cycle in the United
States, interest in the working-class emerged with questions concerning the
demographic's political leanings. Traditionally depicted as heavily white and male, and
more broadly, without a college education, campaign pundits and news commentators,
liberal professionals in their educated enclaves, and others pondered how Republican
candidate Donald Trump won the support of working-class people. How could the white
working-class support a rich businessman like Donald Trump? Some ponderings, like
those of National Review correspondent Kevin Williamson, were critical:
The [American underclass] may sing hymns to Trump the destroyer and whisper
darkly about “globalists” and – odious, stupid term — “the Establishment,” but
nobody did this to them. They failed themselves . . . The truth about these
dysfunctional, downscale communities is that they deserve to die. Economically,
they are negative assets . . . The white American underclass is in thrall to a
vicious, selfish culture whose main products are misery and used heroin needles.
Donald Trump’s speeches make them feel good. So does OxyContin.
The sea of embittered white faces donning the infamous red "Make America Great
Again" ballcaps on their heads at Trump's campaign rallies, through Rust Belt cities and
across the nation, helped solidify a general impression of who Trump's constituents were,
and for many other frustrated Americans, this also helped identify who was responsible
and deserving of blame for a Trump presidency. One major culprit was white working-
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class men.
The popular narrative became that the disenfranchised white working-class were
disenchanted with a seemingly out-of-touch Democratic Party, thereby flocking to
support Donald Trump, the candidate who tapped into a slew of anxieties ranging from
their anger toward immigrants, far removed politicians, an inefficient government, job
loss, and economic shifts (Francis). However, this characterization of the typical Trump
voter is only part of the story. Despite substantial support from the white working-class,
the support of middle-class and upper-class white voters also made a significant impact in
the electorate. Many of Trump’s voters had household incomes above the median of
$56,000, in fact, the median household income of Trump primary voters was $72,000
(Silver).
While a multitude of studies have considered the demographics of voters, this
project is not another attempt to determine who is responsible for Trump's presidency.
While these statistics can be a place for beginning to understand the Trump-supporting
demographics, they may be referred to by those confused or disappointed with election
results as an attempt to place blame. Many are trying to understand this specific political
moment we are in, but in order to achieve this understanding we must move beyond
identifying who voted for whom and focus on the how and why. This is why I am more
concerned with the cultural divide such figures point to and the ways in which responses
to these figures further demonstrate, and in fact reify, this exact divide. Rather than being
empirical, this project is conceptual. Through this conceptual endeavor, I hope to tear
down "empathy walls" and construct "empathy bridges," concepts sociologist Arlie
Hochschild frequently returns to in Strangers in their own Land: Anger and Mourning on
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the American Right, a valuable and compelling account of the gulf between conservative,
white, working-class Tea Party members in Louisiana and those in liberal academic
enclaves.
In this work, I set out to illustrate how epistemic injustice functions in the divide
between white working-class men and the educated elite. I do this by discussing the
discursive ways in which working-class knowledge and experience are devalued as
legitimate sources of knowledge. I demonstrate this by using critical discourse analysis as
a method for interpreting the underlying attitudes and ideologies in comments made by
Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump during their 2016 presidential campaigns. I also
discuss how these ideologies are positively or negatively perceived by Trump’s workingclass base. In this chapter, I articulate these arguments further. Using feminist standpoint
theory and phenomenology as a lens of interpretation, I argue that white working-class
men are increasingly alienated from progressive politics through classist and ableist
rhetoric and that if progressives wish to win over white working-class men, they will
need to ameliorate this division, otherwise this gap will continue to grow.
This thesis is organized into four chapters. This first chapter provides a literature
review noting the historical and persisting association between class and intelligence, and
literature on anti-intellectualism, identity, intersectionality, and masculinity. It also
introduces the topic of epistemic injustice and the cultural divide between white,
working-class men and the educated elite, specifically grounded in the moment of the
2016 presidential election. The next chapter is on methodology, which addresses the
conceptual frameworks I touch on in this first chapter, such as standpoint theory,
phenomenology, and class identity, but in greater detail. It also explains my method of
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analysis, critical discourse analysis. In the third chapter, I provide a critical discourse
analysis of Hillary Clinton calling half of Trump’s supporters a “basket of deplorables,”
Donald Trump’s television advertisement responding to Clinton’s remarks, and his
responding comments. These instances illustrate a divide between the white workingclass and the educated elite, epistemic injustice, and the resulting logic of working-class
disdain for those with epistemic authority. In the fourth chapter, I discuss the broader
political and social implications for my analysis and I conclude this thesis by
summarizing my key points and discussing directions for future research and classsensitive praxis.

LITERATURE REVIEW
After reviewing the literature, which includes political writings, popular media,
and academic scholarship, I have identified a notable gap in work criticizing or even
acknowledging the Left’s engagement with classist or ableist rhetoric in their assessments
of both Trump and his supporters. Andrew Harnish’s article, “Ableism and the Trump
Phenomenon,” primarily assesses the ableism of Trump’s rhetoric which includes
“repeated use of metaphors equating bodily difference with weakness and failure” and the
embedded ableism of rural, white, working-class infrastructure and culture, but only
peripherally touches on the Left’s hypocritical mocking of Trump’s bodily difference
(423). Even Harnish’s criticism of the Left’s alarming willingness to engage in ableist
mockery of Trump neglects to acknowledge the cognitive aspect of difference which
includes the routine engagement in insulting the intellectual capacity of Trump and his
supporters, which are highly perceived as rural, white, and working-class.
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A gap in the literature is certainly, at least in part, due to Trump’s election still
being fairly recent, but the cultural gap between the educated elite and white workingclass voters has been growing for at least the last decade, when white working-class
voters became a significant concern for Republican candidates seeking the presidency
(for example, Sarah Palin’s Joe the Plumber references, and Mitt Romney’s struggle to
appeal to the working-class). While literature addressing the educated elite’s usage of
ableist rhetoric when referring to white working-class voters is absent, there is work, such
as Mark Proudman’s “‘The Stupid Party’: Intellectual Repute as a Category of
Ideological Analysis,” that addresses the historical, cultural, and political divide between
Conservatives and Progressives, and the attribution of intelligence to some thoughts and
ideas while denying it to others. There is also expansive scholarship on historical
perceptions and constructions of rural, working-class, and poor whites as stupid,
immoral, dirty, and lazy (Wray). I am suggesting that these older discourses have shaped
present-day perceptions of the white working-class and are manifesting in the ways
Trump and his white working-class base are perceived (as “deplorable” or stupid).
Stereotypes associating class with intelligence have deep historical roots. In her
book White Trash: The 400-Year Untold Story of Class in America, Nancy Isenberg
explains that these historical roots stretch through eugenicist thinking in the United States
during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and even further back, tracing to
European origins prior to expansions West. In the sixteenth century, Britain was
becoming increasingly stratified, and the poor were seen as inferior to the wealthy, and
more educated, aristocracy (Isenberg). Therefore, they were thought of as disposable
“trash people,” or even a separate degenerate human breed (Isenberg). Beginning in the
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early 1600s, these “trash people” were shipped off to the New World, or what Isenberg
describes as a dumping ground for undesirables. Once relocated, these undesirables
provided exploitable labor in Jamestown and what would later become established
colonies (Isenberg). Their survival in those early years was ultimately insignificant to
their country of origin because they were viewed as abundant and expendable (Isenberg).
Isenberg writes that those who survived reproduced, providing more bodies for “an
expendable class of laborers who made colonization possible . . . fertilizing the soil with
their labor while finding it impossible to harvest any social mobility” themselves (42).
The poor were viewed as human waste and were imported by the Virginia
Company as indentured servants and laborers, auctioned off to the privileged, wealthy,
landowning few (Isenberg). In 1618, land was allotted based on a head count, so there
was incentive to “import laborers, dead or alive” (Isenberg 26). Many of these imported
laborers were orphans and adolescent boys who, under brutal conditions, were “literally
worked to death” (Isenberg 28). By 1630, there was a mass migration to the Bay Colony
(Isenberg 28). Isenberg writes that 21,000 settlers arrived, 40 percent of which were from
areas with high percentages of Puritan converts. However, there was an equal number of
“commercially driven emigrant[s] from . . . England . . . accompanied by their servants”
(Isenberg 29). Approximately “60 percent of the arrivals were under the age of twentyfour—one-third of them unattached males” (29).
Belief in the degeneracy of these poor, white, laborers, in the coming centuries
would fester, and discourse would evolve to bolster eugenicist thinking and the further
association of class with intelligence. By the 1800s, poor whites in the South were
viewed as utterly worthless and inherently ignorant. Isenberg explains,
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No longer were white trash simply freaks of nature on the fringe of society; they
were now congenitally delinquent, a withered branch of the American family tree.
As a “fungus growth,” they could weaken the entire stock of southern society.
More than tallow-colored skin, it was the permanent mark of intellectual
stagnation, the “inert” minds, the “fumbling” speech, and the “stupid, moony
glare, like that of the idiot.” They were, it was said, of the “homo genus without
the sapien.” (180)
The question, then, that was pondered by elite observers was “if poor white men were
dragging down the rest of the nation” (Isenberg 198).
With the increasing popularity of statistical measurements of the human body,
mind, and ability, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, IQ (intelligence
quotient) tests emerged to classify individuals by their intellect (Isenberg; Davis).
Findings gathered from the administering of these tests were used to justify prejudiced
views of both poor white and black people in the South (Isenberg). Many of the
historically contextualized negative perceptions of and prejudices against poor whites in
the South were eventually extended to rural whites in general. Matt Wray, in his seminal
work, Not Quite White: White Trash and the Boundaries of Whiteness, traces the
historical significance of words and phrases like “redneck,” “dirt-eater,” and “white
trash,” and likewise contends that such methods of eugenics successfully shaped
collective representations of and general discourse regarding lower-class whites vis à vis
the professional middle-classes through the spreading of regionally-specific terms and
perceptions of “white trash.” In time, and through discursive chains of association, “poor
white trash” no longer referred exclusively to “a stigmatized and despised social group in
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the South” (95), but to poor whites in other rural places as well, thereby extending the
stigmatypes of "immoral, lazy, dirty, criminal, filthy, and perverse" more generally to
include poor rural whites elsewhere (95).
Similar perceptions linger into the present. Working-class activist and writer
Elliott identifies multiple definitions of the term “redneck” ranging from the denotative
“member of the white rural laboring class” (277), to the connotative “person who
advocates a provincial, conservative, often bigoted sociopolitical attitude characteristic of
a redneck” (278), and finally to its usage by progressives, “Any person who is racist,
violent, uneducated, and stupid (as if they are the same thing),” or “a synonym for every
type of oppressive belief except classism” (280). Conservatism and bigotry or narrowmindedness has often been associated with archetypes of stupidity, while Progressivism
has been associated with archetypes of intelligence and sophistication, argues Mark
Proudman. He elaborates more on this cultural and political divide:
Leftists . . . frequently claim superior knowledge, intellectual competence, and
cultural sophistication . . . often based upon the universally explanatory power of
revered texts correctly interpreted . . . [and] reinforced by signifying terminology .
. . Rightist[s] . . . by contrast are less likely to appeal to such intellectualized kinds
of theory, and more likely to appeal to established morality, to patriotism, to other
group loyalties, to familiar customs, or . . . ‘common- sense.’ This . . . is a direct
invocation of intellectual disrepute, . . . often combined with an attack on the
[Leftist’s] unpatriotic, unmanly, overly fancy, or theoretical character. (201)
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Proudman goes on to claim that these differences correlate to class, with the Progressive
intelligentsia having the power and influence to base their self-image on claims to
superior intelligence.
The rigid and hierarchical divide between the rich and working-class individuals
continues to function as an indication of intelligence. In part, this is due to the
institutional role of education in immersing students in neoliberal discourses of a
hierarchical social and economic world, “grounded in ideals of individual responsibility,
autonomous transformation, deregulation of markets, and the diminished role of society,”
as opposed to working for a collective good or finding happiness and fulfillment through
one’s own internal sense of worth (Jones and Vagle 132). Such neoliberal discourses thus
construct “hierarchies of desire, entitlement, intelligence, and worth as reflected in the
stratified winners and losers of materialism and capitalism” (132). Through these
discourses, privilege and exploitation are produced and upheld, individuals are socialized
to believe in a limitless capacity to change their living conditions, and attention is steered
away from criticizing government and economic policy responsible for shaping
inequitable social and economic outcomes that limit an individual’s capacity to transform
oneself in accordance to a neoliberal doctrine of self-development (Jones and Vagle).
In Thinking Class: Sketches from a Cultural Worker, Jo Kadi argues that “stupid”
has become more than a description of someone’s intellectual ability, but rather that it is
“a cultural concept with a particular code and set of signifiers that describe working-class
people as the middle and upper classes perceive and construct [them]” (48-49). He
describes his experience in academia as a working-class student, dealing with internalized
feelings of class inferiority, and grappling with feeling as if privileged people belonged in
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higher education and he did not. He often struggled to feel welcome with the prevailing
attitudes, held by others and internalized, that working-class people were “too stupid to
study, learn, think, analyze, [or] critique” (41). According to Kadi, the capitalist system
depends on those “bred for stupid and/or dangerous work” believing they are less
intelligent than those in charge (43). To explain the reasoning for this, Kadi suggests that
the false perception that working-class people are intellectually inferior functions to
justify class divisions, and ultimately, class oppression.
Kadi’s account is especially valuable for its deconstruction of the term “stupid,”
often defined as “slow of mind, obtuse, brutish” (48). Despite “rationally” knowing that it
was a lie, Kadi recounts internalizing the belief that intelligence and class are related,
believing in his own stupidity as a working-class person, and the stupidity of the
working-class (40). Kadi describes the “cultural baggage” of stupidity as an embodied
experience which he “learned in his bones before [he] could talk” (48). This account is
filled with language that acknowledges a pre-reflective knowledge, or a “infraconscious
competence that is a result of their immersion within the realm of the social”
(Charlesworth 29). Kadi’s description of stupidity as “cultural baggage” also brings to
light the ableist connotations and history of the term “stupid,” including systemic abuses
against the neuro-divergent, non-consensual experimental medical procedures, and forced
sterilizations (Stern). A hierarchy of the moral goodness, worth, or value of intelligence is
in itself ableist.
Additionally, Kadi challenges how intelligence and knowledge is defined and
brings recognition to a variety of forms of knowledge by highlighting the fact that many
top paying jobs do not require intelligence or creativity while many working-class jobs
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do. Kelly Bradbury makes a similar argument in her book Reimagining Popular Notions
of American Intellectualism: Literacy, Education, and Class, by proposing a broader and
more democratic definition of intellectualism through her research of sites that are not
normally considered to be intellectual. Bradbury argues that people outside the typical
realms of intellectualism do engage in intellectual work and are intellectual, maintaining
that her research
work[s] to contest assumptions that the study of useful knowledge, education for a
practical purpose, basic literacy education, adult education in general, and
education at non-elite institutions have not fostered—or cannot foster—
intellectualism among the American public. (28)
Gramsci, too, claims that “technical education, closely bound to industrial labor, even at
the most primitive and unqualified level, must form the basis of the new type of
intellectual,” expressing the intellectual value of the working-class and of practical,
experiential knowledge (9-10). In this sense, I am rejecting intellectualism in its elitist,
classist, and ableist form that attempts to invalidate other types of knowing, and
proposing, like Bradbury, that what is considered valid intellectually should be broadened
so that other forms of knowing can “count.” Even then, intellectualism should not deny
an individual the right or legitimacy to having valued experiences and perspectives on
matters in their life.
Perpetuating ideas that class and intelligence are correlated serves a hegemonic
purpose. It is important to note that one of the most critical aspects to maintaining the
present class structure is working-class people internalizing the belief that they are
intellectually inferior in many respects, and that it is intellect that is responsible for
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greater economic success. This diverts attention away from systemic oppression and
centers it on meritocratic understandings of success (Kadi). Fostering this divide, and
even encouraging anti-intellectual or anti-elite sentiment among the working-class may in
fact reinforce this class structure, especially in the case that these sentiments also serve to
inform an understanding that higher education is a place for only a certain kind of
individual, namely, an individual with class privilege.
Both Kelly Bradbury and Daniel Rigney discuss this concept of antiintellectualism at length, each referring primarily to the most popular work on the topic,
Richard Hofstadter’s 1963 book, Anti-intellectualism in American Life. In his Pulitzer
Prize winning work, Hofstadter defines anti-intellectualism as “resentment and suspicion
of the life of the mind and of those who are considered to represent it; and a disposition
constantly to minimize the value of that life” (7). Hofstadter’s work, in addition to The
Closing of the American Mind, by Allan Bloom in 1987, and The Dumbest Generation,
by Mark Bauerlein in 2008, portray anti-intellectualism as a resentment of intellectuals
and intellectual life1. While Lemann notes that Hofstadter does not depict “American life
as a struggle between the superior, enlightened few and the mass of yobs,2” Bradbury
argues that, collectively, these authors have contributed to a public discourse that only
certain kinds of people can be intellectuals or engage in intellectual life. This rhetoric has
contributed to understandings of who qualifies as an intellectual and who does not, and in
the same vein, whose knowledge is legitimate and whose is not (Rigney; Bradbury).
1

To clarify, throughout this thesis I use “intellectuals” and the “educated elite” interchangeably, but it is
worth noting that I am not negatively referring to intelligent people or intelligence, but rather the culture of
elitism that is associated with privileged access to education and intellectual life. “Intellectual life” refers to
institutionalized and legitimized forms of knowledge often associated with the academy.
2
A “yob” is a slang term used in the UK that refers to an uncultured or unsophisticated person, usually
working-class and male.
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Consequently, these understandings of who is and who is not an intellectual function to
hegemonically reinforce a hierarchy of knowledge, and as hegemony typically functions,
maintain the present ideologies, norms, values, institutions, and structures that benefit the
dominant class (Gramsci).
Together, Bradbury alleges, these authors depict American society as having
descended from intelligence to apathy and ignorance, and that technology is dumbing
down society. It may be heavy-handed to include Hofstadter in such a claim, however,
due to his argument being that anti-intellectualism has been an unavoidable part of
American democracy from the beginning (Lemann). Nevertheless, Bradbury’s point
stands that these three primary texts are responsible for shaping much of the conversation
of anti-intellectualism in the United States.
Rigney discusses anti-elitism as one facet of anti-intellectualism, connecting to
class. Others, such as working-class people, interpret some intellectual values as elitist
which can illicit “mistrust of claims to superior knowledge . . . on the part of an educated
elite, especially when such claims are suspected to be instruments in the service of class
privilege” (Rigney 441). These thoughts among working-class people and others
marginalized by their socioeconomic status have historically contributed to the
development of populist movements, as they are seen to be more representative of
“common people,” devaluing “theoretic learning” as evidence of privilege. This leads to
the working-class idealized image of “the rough and ready man of action . . .
unencumbered by the weight of too much book learning” (Rigney 441). So, it is apparent
that the debates of intellectualism and elitism also carry a gendered element, depicting a
man ready for action, rather than an “unmanly” or “effeminate” intellectual male, as the
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stereotype goes (Rigney 442). In what follows, I will elaborate on the construction of
masculinity, as well as its variations as it intersects with class and race.
David Roediger notes that multiple axes of identity are invoked simply in the
word “worker,” presuming both whiteness and maleness, despite the fact that average
workers are increasingly people of color and women. The phrase “working man” denotes
both a gender and class identity, but also a racial identity, “an identification of whiteness
and work so strong that it need not even be spoken” (Roediger 19). Although the
naturalness of the category of the white worker or the working man is problematic in its
exclusion of people of color and women, it is crucial to understand the historic weight of
invoking and claiming the identity of “working man” for all of the gendered, classed, and
raced undertones contained within it. Since Kimberlé Crenshaw coined the term
“intersectionality” in 1989, intersectional approaches to scholarly work on identity have
become popular across disciplines (Hancock). Intersectionality helps to account for the
multiple and overlapping identities that people hold, including: race, ethnicity, gender,
sex, sexual orientation, class, and ability. Intersectionality is important for thinking about
the ways in which systems of oppression intersect and even constitute one another. I
include intersectionality in this project because it is crucial for thinking about white
working-class men and the nuances of their positioning within society. Because they are
white and men, identity politics tends to leave them out3, but recognizing how their
gender, race, and class intersect can allow us to be more aware of both their privilege and
class marginalization, helping us to build bridges of inclusion.

3

This is in part due to the prevailing discourse that the status of “man” or “white” are the default and that
gender or race must refer to any deviation from that default (Beauvoir; Crenshaw).
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In this work, I understand gender not as a stable identity that one holds, but rather
a repeated set of external acts and gestures that, through their performance, socially
construct the gender they are said to embody (Butler). This repetition of the performative
construction of gender through time allows for a fluid conceptualization of gender, as it is
socially constructed and varies by social context, time, and place (Butler). Gender
requires repeated performativity and repeated proof, as total and perfect acquisition or
performance of gender is always elusive and never possible (Butler; West and
Zimmerman). Still, some may inevitably live up to the standards better than others and
come quite close to embodying aspects of the fluctuating standards at times, resulting in
the development of gender hierarchies (Connell and Messerschmidt). It is because gender
is unstable and constructed through time that these standards and expectations vary
(Butler). These variances result in multiple masculinities (Connell and Messerschmidt).
In local contexts, with the developing of dominant and subordinate masculinities
in relation to one another, “protest masculinities” can emerge (Connell and
Messerschmidt). Protest masculinities demonstrate how subordinate masculinities can
develop to help “recognize the agency of . . . marginalized groups” (847). One such
example of a protest masculinity develops among working-class men, enabling a “claim
to power typical of regional hegemonic masculinities in Western countries . . . [despite]
lack[ing] the economic resources and institutional authority that underpins the regional
global patterns” of hegemonic masculinity (848). This type of protest masculinity is a
construction of a version of masculinity that identifies with another specific group
characteristic or identity, such as being working-class, disabled, or queer (Connell and
Messerschmidt; Coston and Kimmel).
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Bethany Coston and Michael Kimmel elaborate on what can be understood as
protest masculinities in their article “Seeing Privilege Where it isn’t: Marginalized
Masculinities and the Intersectionality of Privilege.” They discuss the marginalized status
of gay men, men with disabilities, and working-class men, noting that, despite being
privileged in their male status, these men still experience marginalization in other facets
of their identity. Working-class men are both othered by dominant masculinities and by
themselves through insisting that they are different from upper and middle-class men
(Coston and Kimmel). However, some may take it further to suggest that the physical
requirements of their manual labor, or the risk inherent to their occupations, render their
masculinity superior to middle-class men working office jobs, which are thought to be
more leisurely and less requiring of hard work (Coston and Kimmel; Morris). The
working-class claim to masculinity is attacked due to their marginalized class status. In
some cases, they may respond to this with the absolute refusal to “’upper-class’
imperatives,” such as “social mobility, knowledge and skill acquisition,” and thus, they
may instead choose to “reproduce themselves as working class, despite the social and
financial consequences” (Coston and Kimmel 109).
Employing Goffman’s strategies for stigma management, Coston and Kimmel
suggest that men with marginalized masculinities may respond to their marginalization
by seeking to emphasize their differences from the dominant group, trying to emphasize
their similarities to a dominant group, or emphasizing their differences and claiming that
they are in fact superior to the dominant group. The distancing that occurs through
emphasizing differences between the dominant and marginalized groups can explain the
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distancing that occurs when working-class people differentiate themselves from elite
intellectuals (Coston and Kimmel).
I include the intersectionality of privilege and Coston and Kimmel’s work on
marginalized men’s strategies for responding to their marginalization because this work
is crucial for understanding epistemic injustice and the nuanced experiences and
perspectives that white, working-class men have, especially in the context of the 2016
presidential election. I will explain this further in the following section.

THE GAP BETWEEN WHITE WORKING-CLASS MEN
AND THE EDUCATED ELITE
In this current political milieu, a sharp distinction between members of the white
working-class and the intellectual educated elite is gaining momentum. Such a divide
further perpetuates the exclusion and self-exclusion of working-class people. Considering
legitimated and delegitimated forms of knowledge, perception, status, disposition, and
speech in his influential book, A Phenomenology of Working Class Experience, Simon
Charlesworth contends that because working-class people are denied the economic and
cultural resources to found lives of self-value through the primary institutions of
legitimacy, they “elect to exclude themselves in an attempt to exercise symbolically a
volition effectively denied them” (235). However, this “assertion of cultural identity . . .
emerges out of an implicit sense of oneself as devalued, as fractured and damaged, as
‘not clever’ and thus condemned to a life of insecurity and hardship” (235). During the
2016 presidential election, Democratic candidate Hillary Clinton described Trump's
supporters as falling into two baskets, one of which being those who feel the government
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has failed them and simply want change, and the other being a "basket of deplorables"
who are "racist, sexist, homophobic, xenophobic, [and] islamaphobic [sic]" (Reilly).
Following Clinton's comments came both Far-Right backlash and the reclaiming of the
term “deplorable” among Trump's supporters. This instance notably illustrates a divide
between the educated elite and the working-classes; especially because the term
“deplorable” itself is not reflective of working-class speech, although it was reclaimed in
spite and taken up as a badge of honor. This reveals a potential “implicit sense of oneself
as devalued,” but it also illustrates a simultaneous exclusion and self-exclusion
(Charlesworth 235).
Specifically, this project is concerned with exclusion and the class cultural divide
Joan C. Williams identifies in her book White Working Class: Overcoming Class
Cluelessness in America. My work is different from previous work on the topic of white
working-class men because I build on Williams's idea of a class-cultural divide, made
most visible in US politics in the last decade, and I introduce Miranda Fricker's concept
of epistemic injustice, which she defines as “[being] wronged in one’s capacity as a
knower” (44), to the discussion of white working-class men and politics in the United
States. Indeed, white working-class men are often victims of class marginalization, and
their situated knowledges are rendered unheard and unacknowledged through a process
of epistemic injustice. Through strategies of epistemic injustice, white working-class men
are increasingly alienated from progressive politics. Thus, I argue, by way of feminist
standpoint theory and phenomenology, that white working-class men are situated in a
particular embodied and social position that provides access to a horizon of knowledge
useful for understanding intersecting systems of oppression, particularly along the axes of
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class, gender, race, and ability. Often in critiquing working-class discourses that are
(overly) characterized by elements of racism and sexism, progressives, academics, and
intellectuals invoke classist and ableist rhetoric, ultimately reinscribing a cultural divide
between the working-classes and the educated elite. Such rhetoric further alienates and
stigmatizes white working-class men, reinforces the association of class with intelligence,
obscures the intersectionality of privilege, and strengthens responding disdain among
white working-class men for those in positions of high status, whom they understand to
be the elite, generally considered to be gatekeepers of legitimated knowledge and have
epistemic authority.
In addition to arguing for an understanding of the epistemic positioning of white
working-class men via phenomenology and standpoint, I also utilize critical discourse
analysis as a reflexive methodological tool in order to help illustrate my claims. I apply
critical discourse analysis to specific instances including Hillary Clinton calling half of
Trump’s supporters a “basket of deplorables,” Donald Trump’s response through a thirty
second television advertisement, and his responding comments given at a rally in
Asheville, North Carolina a few days after Clinton’s initial remarks. I analyze these
textual examples because they are “critical discourse moments,” such moments that,
according to Anabela Carvalho, challenge established discursive positions and are
defined through political activity and socially relevant events (166).
By delving into the situated knowledge and social positioning of white workingclass men, I want to better understand the nuanced concept of epistemic credibility and
the injustice that occurs when such credibility is denied. Fricker best articulates the
epistemic consequences that occur through both testimonial injustice—the diminished
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credibility of the speaker due to the hearer’s prejudices—and hermeneutical injustice—
the diminished intelligibility of a marginalized person’s experiences due to a
community’s lack in hermeneutical resources. These concepts are crucial for recognizing
the connections between identity and material conditions, and further, how such identities
and material conditions are organized by the inclusion and exclusion of particular voices
(Kokushkin).
Fricker argues that the consequences of epistemic injustice include both an ethical
and a political dimension that enables further domination. She further contends that “to
be wronged in one’s capacity as a knower is to be wronged in a capacity essential to
human value . . . [bearing] a social meaning to the effect that the subject is less than fully
human” (44). Fricker acknowledges the identity prejudice that associates working-class
people, among other historically powerless groups such as women or people of color,
with "attribute[s] inversely related to competence or sincerity"; however, she does not
exclusively focus her attention on the lived, material, and situated experiences of white
working-class people (32). Her assessment of epistemic injustice is of oppressed groups
in general.
Central to such conversations of knowledge and credibility are the concepts of
identity, situated knowledge, and lived experience. Thinking through epistemic injustice
alongside embodied notions of identity and perception is helpful for providing a more
nuanced conception of epistemic injustice. I use standpoint epistemology and
phenomenology in order to consider these concepts in their full complexity. Helping to
articulate what is known and from what position within society, standpoint epistemology
asserts that lived experience and situated knowledge provides a position of epistemic
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privilege (Harstock; P.H. Collins). In other words, lived experience is a legitimate and
valuable source of knowledge. While phenomenology differs from standpoint in some
ways, I find its emphasis on embodiment, perception, and the unification of the mind and
body, and thus, the equal valuing of cognitive and physical forms of knowledge
acquisition, to be complementary to standpoint’s focus on lived experience and situated
knowledge (Harstock; Merleau-Ponty; P.H. Collins).
Because identity and social positioning are often interconnected, I consider
Alcoff’s contention that there is indeed a correlation between social identity and
epistemic credibility. Likewise, Mohanty argues that “social locations facilitate or inhibit
knowledge by predisposing us to register and interpret information in certain ways. Our
relation to social power produces “forms of blindness,” just as it enables “degrees of
lucidity” (234). Alcoff’s understanding of this is that “identities operate as horizons from
which certain aspects or layers of reality can be made visible,” thereby asserting that
“social identity operates then as a rough and fallible but useful indicator of differences in
perceptual access” (82). Thus, I take inspiration from Alcoff's existential,
phenomenological, and hermeneutic conception of identity as horizon, “a site from which
one is open to the world, a site from which one must engage in the process of meaningmaking” (Alcoff 43).
A knowledge claim developed through access to perceptual facts, Alcoff
contends, "needs to be supported by a theory of perception" (83). Such a theory of
perception is found in the work of phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty who posits
that knowledge is based in perception and the situated, concrete, and dynamic bodily
experience. Complementing notions of perceptual access, I turn to phenomenological
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concepts of reflective and pre-reflective knowledge which are acquired through embodied
experience (Moran and Mooney). Phenomenology functions as a methodological
conception focused not on the “what” but on the “how” of embodied perception and
situated knowledge (Moran and Mooney). Charlesworth writes of this crucial
situatedness claiming that
[one] is touched by one’s environment, such that one comes to recognize the
solicitations of the world, and respond through the primary bodily rhythms of fear
and insecurity, the primary affective sense, through which locality and self-hood
emerge from the flow of perceptual and practical sense that root us in a particular
world. (129)
According to Charlesworth, working-class people experience the world in a less
mediated way than those with greater access to symbolic capital. A greater proximity to
need impacts bodily hexis, comportment, and gestures, as well as speech habits, and ways
of relating to language in general. In contrast, the dominant class is likely to invest “its
relation to language with the same distancing intention it engages in its relation to the
body” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 149). These claims are similar to Marx’s, with which he
asserts that capitalists are disembodied or have access to a surrogate body, with more
layers of capital between themselves and the material conditions of life in comparison to
the working-classes whose bodies are exposed to the harsh conditions of labor and
necessity. This might be especially true for those in physically demanding jobs where
injury is more likely to occur, such as logging and coal or steel mining, jobs which tend
to be male-dominated, especially in rural areas (“Those Who Work” Sherman).
The assertion of the validity of knowledge acquired through embodiment parallels
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standpoint’s similar privileging of situated knowledge. These ideas also counter the
historical devaluing of experiential and pre-reflective knowledge in comparison to the
knowledge of reason and reflection, and work to subvert the Cartesian mind/body duality
by insisting that all knowledge and consciousness is necessarily embodied, a cornerstone
to phenomenological thought (Merleau-Ponty; P.H. Collins). Recognizing the
delegitimation of working-class knowledge and experience through the delegitimation of
the body, I will explore the continued discursive association of class with intelligence: the
stereotype that working-class people are intellectually inferior functions to justify class
divisions, and ultimately, class oppression (Kadi). This rhetoric has also contributed to
understandings of who qualifies as an intellectual and who does not, and in the same
vein, whose knowledge is legitimate and whose is not (Bradbury; Rigney). Consequently,
these understandings of who is and who is not an intellectual function to hegemonically
reinforce a hierarchy of knowledge, and maintain the present ideologies, norms, values,
institutions, and structures that benefit the dominant classes (Gramsci). This hierarchy of
knowledge stems from the aforementioned Cartesian mind/body duality that posits that
intelligence is a characteristic of the mind and is associated with reason. It is by this
access to reason that humans are thought to be superior to other animals. Reason being
the distinctive feature suggests that the mind is superior to the body and this belief has
been absorbed into the fabric of Western thought for centuries.
Being denied the legitimacy of the life of the mind, working-class people are
reduced to their bodies (Charlesworth). Due to the gendered pressures of “breadwinning,”
the expectation for men to work to provide an income intended to fully support their wife
and children, this emphasis on a bodily capacity to labor may also be especially gendered
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to men (Kimmel and Ferber). Connell notes that “[t]rue masculinity is almost always
thought to proceed from men's bodies—to be inherent in a male body or to express
something about a male body” (44). Such a bodily focus translates to labor, constituting
an intrinsic aspect of working-class identity (Charlesworth).
A working-class emphasis on the body is apparent in a conversation Charlesworth
describes having with a young working-class adolescent who believes his teachers direct
him in ways that make him feel as if there are things he is unable to do. Thus, he
struggles in school and does not feel like education is the route for him. The fifteen-yearold explains that this impacts how he views the future for possible work and concludes
that because he does not have “much of a brain,” he might as well use his body since he
has that (Charlesworth 240). This conversation highlights the nominating power of the
institution of education and for those in positions of epistemic authority (in this case, the
teachers), and how working-class people are relegated to a realm of the physical where
they are destined to work with their bodies, and “find expertise in the realm of the
competence they are constituted as possessing” (Charlesworth 241). This dualism leaves
working-class people, specifically working-class men, with their material bodies whose
only devalued legitimacy comes from the labor or technical skills they are able to
perform.
Finally, I will discuss the implications of denying white working-class men
epistemic credibility, one major trend being a disdain for educated people in positions of
high status, generally considered to have epistemic authority. Some examples of figures
with epistemic authority are academics, politicians, and reporters/the news media. One
important caveat is that although Trump is a politician, he has portrayed himself as an
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outsider to politics, and therefore, by his supporters, he is understood not as a
representative of epistemic authority, but as a successful and self-made businessman who
represents the interests of others who have felt like an outsider to politics. Additionally,
there is a persistent, and perhaps contradictory, belief among working-class people that
there is some correlation between intelligence and wealth (Lamont). So, while some of
the wealthy are viewed positively, there is also a disdain for those intellectuals who are
associated with elitism and legitimized, institutionalized forms of knowledge. This trend
of disdain for epistemic authority as a response to epistemic injustice points to a larger,
pre-existing cultural divide between the (white) working-class as “common people” and
the “silent majority,” versus the intellectual, educated elite.
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CHAPTER 2:
METHODOLOGY

OVERVIEW:
This chapter details the methodological basis of this project by expanding on the
theoretical and conceptual foundations and the method of analysis I am using. I explain
the concepts of the intersectionality of privilege, multiple axes of identity, epistemic
injustice, and how I determine class identity. I incorporate theories of phenomenology
and standpoint epistemology with these concepts. Finally, I describe how I understand
critical discourse analysis as a method, and how I plan to apply these concepts to the
discussion of white working-class men and epistemic injustice.

PRIVILEGE AS INTERSECTIONAL
Understanding privilege as multifaceted and intersectional, involving the multiple
identities each individual holds, is important for understanding the experiences of white
working-class men. Privilege, the special rights or advantages granted to certain
individuals or groups, is typically associated with whiteness and maleness. However, in
terms of their class positioning, white working-class men are marginalized.
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Nell Painter describes the intersectionality of privilege, as it pertains to whiteness,
suggesting that,
The degree to which white identity alone confers privilege is mediated more so
than in the past by the significance of other variables—class, gender, region, age,
able-bodiedness, sexuality, and so on. (388)
Indeed, with stagnating wages since the 1970s, job losses in industrial occupations, and
the increasing gap between the rich and the poor, many members of the white workingclass are now in economically precarious positions (Sherman). Linda Martín Alcoff
asserts that this increase in economic instability among white working-class people is not
due to being targeted because they are white, but rather, as economist Richard Wolff
argues, evidences that their whiteness does not protect them from the economic damages
of imperial capitalism.
The intersectionality of privilege also relates to a larger understanding of subjects
and their intermeshedness within multiple systems of power. Lugones, for example, does
not accept a simple oppressor/oppressed binary and instead proposes subjects as
oppressing, being oppressed, and resisting depending on the context. Nodding to
Lugones, Mariana Ortega writes,
There is not a simple dichotomy between marginalized/nonmarginalized or
oppressed/oppressor. Selves need to be understood in their complexity and in
terms of the different roles they play in the matrix of power relations such that
each of us can be understood variously as oppressors, oppressed, or resisting.
(51)
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Including the intersectionality of privilege in this project and frequently returning
to it is significant because the attitude that white working-class men are not oppressed in
any way has contributed to their alienation. Thus, it is worth remembering that just as
identities and systems of oppression are complex, varied, and intersecting, so too is the
notion of privilege.

DETERMINING CLASS IDENTITY
To discuss issues pertaining to the working-class, it is essential to be clear with
what is meant by the term “working-class” and how it is used in this project. The term is
used extensively and frequently, but precise definitions are hard to come by and often
disputed. Class itself becomes a blurred category, with most Americans tending to refer
to themselves as middle-class, a flaw Joan Williams identifies as “class cluelessness.” For
example, Williams cites that it is not uncommon for individuals making incomes as
disparate as $22,000 or $200,000 to both identify themselves as middle-class.
Determining an objective definition of social class and socioeconomic status, in general,
is a contentious process. A Marxian definition of working-class includes anyone who
does not own the means of production and therefore must sell their labor power;
however, this definition is rather broad and could extend from manual laborers or factory
workers, who are more traditionally thought of as working-class, to individuals with
skills more often associated with those belonging to the middle or even upper-class. More
generally, working-class can be understood as being comprised of those without a college
education, who must rely on performing physical labor for an hourly wage (Edsall).
Typically, working-class occupations have been broken down into four main categories:
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unskilled laborers, artisans, outworkers, and factory workers (Doob). This includes
service work and pink collar jobs (Arnold). If defined in terms of income, individuals
falling into the categories of working-class, middle-class, or upper-class often have
differential access to economic and cultural resources, or education, goods, and other
services (Linkon).
Not only are objective measures of social class and socioeconomic status difficult
to establish, they are also not always the best indicators of an individual’s actual standard
of living (Rubin et al.). There are many complications associated with categorizing class
and status in such a way. For example, how many categories should be included? How
should cut off points for each category of class be determined? Answers to these critical
questions are debated and often vary. These are the primary reasons why clear definitions
of working-class, middle-class, or social class, in general, are so hard to delineate
(Bourdieu, “What Makes a Social Class”; Rubin et al.). Furthermore, Bourdieu explains
that “clear-cut discontinuities” are “impossible to find in the real world” to demonstrate
such distinct, objective, and empirical instances of class (2). Other limitations include
restricted generalizability of data due to the fact that findings can only be interpreted
relative to the populations from which they are taken, meaning that the measures are
limited to a specific context and period of time (Rubin et al.). Because populations and
economies can vary quite rapidly, it is likely that objective measures will quickly become
outdated (Rubin et al.). Additionally, and most importantly for the purpose of this thesis,
objective measures do not necessarily assess one’s subjective understanding of their
social class or identity (Rubin et al.).
As Williams, among other scholars, notes, class, in the colloquial sense of the
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term, is often about more than just income or money. An amalgamation of traditions,
behaviors, and ways of life help shape what we then identify as social class or
socioeconomic status. To clarify, there is a distinction between social class and
socioeconomic status. Socioeconomic status can be understood as “one’s current social
and economic situation” and can vary over time (Rubin et al. 196). Social class, on the
other hand, tends to be more stable over time, and “refers to one’s sociocultural
background” (Rubin et al. 196).
Objective measures of a one’s social class are typically figured by referring to
their level of education, income, occupation, and material possessions (Rubin et al.). Like
Rubin et al., Honneth also differentiates between class and status, but defines them
differently. According to Honneth, class relates to distributive dimensions and economic
modes of social ordering typically institutionalized through markets, while status
corresponds to dimensions of social recognition derived from institutionalized patterns of
cultural values and norms. Honneth goes further to contextualize class and status within
systems of power and subordination. Despite Honneth’s distinction between class and
status, he is careful to emphasize that there are points of overlap and even mutual
constitution between the two at times, although one cannot directly infer the other.
However, Honneth maintains that it is essential to refer to both the dimension of status
and class to better understand social life. Both Rubin et al.’s and Honneth’s
understandings are useful here because they help to provide a fuller view of class and
status.
Thus, while objective measures of social class can provide fruitful data for
empirical research, in many respects they are limited, especially in the realm of
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qualitative research assessing identity. With this being said, it is also clear that we are
considering the working-class as having to do with more than simply a category of
income. By integrating a subjective definition of social class, we can help ensure a more
accurate depiction of an individual’s perceived identity, and compensate for what
objective measures might be unable to ascertain (Bourdieu “What Makes a Social Class”;
Rubin et al.). Subjective measures of social class can better assess multiple factors in
constructing class identity that objective measures might overlook. These factors include
economic, cultural, informational, social, and symbolic forms of capital (Bourdieu “What
Makes a Social Class”). Subjective measures are more contextually flexible, allowing for
intersectional analyses of social class with other demographical categories like gender,
ethnicity, or age (Rubin et al.). For those concerned with the validity of a subjective
measure, inaccuracies (e.g. someone describing themselves as working-class despite
having an income of $200,000 that indicates they are likely not working-class) can be
controlled for by more objective measures—another crucial reason for integrating both
measures (Rubin et al.).
For this discussion, a subjective measure is particularly relevant because an
individual’s perceived identity is influential in their perception of if they belong in a
social space (Bourdieu “What Makes a Social Class”). Therefore, by “working-class,” I
am primarily referring to people that self-identify as or associate themselves with the
working-class. Bourdieu writes, “agents are both classified and classifiers, but they
classify according to (or depending upon) that position within classifications” (“What
Makes a Social Class” 2). In other words, individuals can be identified or placed within a
social class by objective measures or by others, and they can place themselves within or
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identify with a social class, but the identification with a social class is also according to or
depending upon their subject positioning, which determines how individuals are
perceived and how individuals perceive themselves. These perceptions influence and are
influenced by one’s habitus, which is a simultaneous process of perceiving and reacting,
both a reflecting and reproducing of social structure (Bourdieu “What Makes a Social
Class”). Thus, subjects within a similar social structure, under similar conditions begin to
“resemble one another . . . [and] come together as a practical group . . . to reinforce their
points of resemblance” (Bourdieu “What Makes a Social Class” 6). Put differently,
habitus is the exposure to similar conditions of existence and conditioning factors that
tend to produce individuals with similar dispositions, practices, and identities (Bourdieu
“What Makes a Social Class” 6). Subjective identities of social class, or the social groups
with which one relates to or associates with, develop within a habitus. This understanding
of identity and environment as co-constitutive reveals “the similar objective conditions,
or habitus, in which people from different social classes live, including their different
access to social, cultural, economic, and symbolic capital” (Rubin et al. 198).
Thinking through the overlapping of class/status and socioeconomic status/social
class alongside Bourdieu’s understanding of habitus, we can consider class and status as
lived-in categories of self-identification, developed over time, and situated within
systems of power. This conceptualization of class and status, as mutually imbricated
aspects of identity and lived-reality, situated within systems of power, is important for
considering the impacts of economic downturn, the precarity of
unemployment/underemployment, and rural poverty on white working-class men’s
identities.
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INTERSECTING AXES OF IDENTITY AND THE “WORKING MAN”
The identity of a “working man” is deceptively complex, invoking a lot more than
simply a man who works. Embedded in this term are also implicit understandings of
class, masculinity, ability, morality, and whiteness (Roediger; Sherman). The notion of
the white working-class is a recent phenomenon, emerging in the nineteenth century with
efforts to distinguish the non-slave labor force from “the bondage of Blacks [which]
served as a touchstone by which dependence and degradation were measured” (Roediger
20). Prior to the nineteenth century, there were no definitive connections between
whiteness and “the defense of one’s independence as a worker” (Roediger 20-21).
According to Roediger, the formation of the identity of the working-class in America
coincided with the development of a systematic consciousness of whiteness, and so the
two are intertwined (8). Despite an increasingly large presence of people of color and
women in the working-class, a “worker” continues to imply male and white (Arnold;
Roediger).
Embedded in the term “working man” are also deeply gendered meanings and
standards of morality. “Manly dignity” is important to white working-class men
(Williams 91). This dignity is often found in the ability to financially provide for a
family, a value that is similar for men from the middle and even upper-class (Williams).
However, in recent decades, the traditionally masculine role of “breadwinner” has been
challenged by economic shifts that have resulted in job losses in male-dominated
occupations (Sherman; Smith). This has been particularly devastating for rural
communities whose economies relied primarily on a single industry such as coal, steel,
textiles, or logging (Sherman). These changes in the economy have forced many families
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to renegotiate gender roles, as women have entered the workforce to contribute to family
finances, or in some cases, to become the family’s sole breadwinner (Sherman; Smith).
Men have especially struggled to reconfigure their identities and self-worth outside of the
breadwinning status (Charlesworth; Sherman). Sherman explains that the myth of
traditional masculinity is still present, but to navigate these challenges, “the requirements
of masculinity have changed to focus more directly on work ethics than on breadwinning
itself” (125). This shift in focus introduced a stronger emphasis on moral capital, a kind
of social or symbolic capital (Sherman). In working-class contexts, such moral capital
might be attainable through focus on work ethic and family life (Pini and Conway;
Sherman).
The term “working man” implies a certain level of ability or physicality. A
capacity for endurance is expected and injury or the wearing down of the body is
understood as an expected outcome of a life of labor and struggle (Puar). In the event of
an injury that prohibits work, Sherman identifies government assistance as a “last resort”
for those living in economic precarity in rural communities, acceptable only under the
pretense of a “dangerous hardworking past” (“Coping With Rural Poverty” 898-899).
These men with acquired disabilities, Sherman deduces, would continue working if work
were available, so it might be inferred that disability is something reluctantly claimed,
and that moral capital is only found in it if the disability is claimed as a result of jobrelated injuries.
However, for the most part, disability is conceptualized as running counter to
hegemonic masculinity, especially in social settings that place such an emphasis on
physicality and labor capacity (Shuttleworth et al.). For many, disability is associated
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with helplessness and dependency, traits which do not meld with working-class
masculine values such as self-sufficiency and reliability (Shuttleworth et al.). With the
emphasis on alternative forms of capital that stress morality, disability might contradict
such standards, if not explicitly, at least implicitly, especially given the historical
discursive association of disability with immorality and sin, much like the moral worth
assigned to markers associated with the status of “healthy” or “unhealthy” (Petersen).
Finally, Charlesworth claims that the body is the “seat” of working-class identity
(238). According to Charlesworth, working-class people are “condemned to dexterity
rather than intelligence,” contributing to this identification with the body (239). Workingclass articulation stems from this relation to the body, revealing much about workingclass identity (Charlesworth). Such an articulatory style reflects straightforwardness,
strength, and avoidance of censorship or formalities in order to show one’s self as reliable
and trustworthy (Charlesworth).
Thus, we can see that the identity of a “working man” is more complex than it
might initially appear. These intersections and embedded meanings will be important
when considering the standpoint and phenomenology of working-class experience. They
will also be important to my use of critical discourse analysis that seeks to make clear
embedded meanings and ideologies.

STANDPOINT AND PHENOMENOLOGY
Standpoint theory is broad and varied, but in general, it can be understood as “a
set of theoretical and epistemological propositions designed to produce alternative
knowledge” (Kokushkin 10). Dominant forms of knowledge tend to be produced by those
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with privilege, typically reflecting androcentric and Western interests rather than being
truly objective (Harding). Dominant knowledge is granted its legitimacy through social
institutions of power, rendering it legitimated knowledge, and all others subjugated
knowledge (P.H. Collins). The alternative knowledge standpoint suggests comes from
“multiple knower-positions . . . [and is] culturally and discursively grounded in
experience” (10). Alternative knowledge and the concept of multiple knowers allows for
standpoint to function in opposition to dominant forms of knowledge and to serve the less
privileged of society (Kokushkin).
This alternative knowledge is generated through different points of perceptual
access (Alcoff; P.H. Collins). In other words, a black woman might have access
knowledge that a white women does not have access to, or a working-class person might
have access to knowledge that an upper-class person does not. To some extent, a person’s
position in society impacts what knowledge they have since knowledge is generated
through experience. This idea is called epistemic privilege. Alcoff understands social
positioning as being intertwined with social identity and influential to which knowledge
is accessible, writing that “identities operate as horizons from which certain aspects or
layers of reality can be made visible,” making social identity “a rough and fallible but
useful indicator of differences in perceptual access” (82). Standpoint theory is crucial to
the topic of the cultural and political divide between white working-class men and the
educated elite because it holds that experiential knowledge is a legitimate and credible
source of knowledge.
Like standpoint theory, phenomenology emphasizes the importance of situated
knowledge. I use phenomenology in conjunction with standpoint because
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phenomenology asserts that knowledge and experience is necessarily embodied
(Merleau-Ponty). Considering the bodily emphasis of working-class experience,
phenomenology is especially significant in its focus on a deeper, pre-reflective type of
knowledge. As Charlesworth explains, “the body thus involves a primordial, prereflective orientation” that is passed on through what Merleau-Ponty refers to as a
“postural impregnation” (18). It is “a way of feeling the world which is an aspect of the
body projecting itself into the world, apprehending significances” (Charlesworth 18). We
are so much more than vehicles of cognitive experience. Charlesworth maintains that
we inhabit the world not merely as perceptual subjects but also as affective
beings. For our perceptions are always inhabited by an excess of meaning,
originating in the primordial grounds of sense, which is more than sensation and
which reveals the world of perception for what it is: the achievement of a bodysubject which has a temporal structure enabling it to carry this primitive
acquisition of horizons which allows a more determinate world of objects and
projects to exist. (18)
I do not want to get lost in discursive trends and lose sight of the bodily and material
experiences such discourse attempts to reflect. Kept in focus is the understanding that
language and the body are so deeply intertwined, and a relation to language and the body
is at the heart of this cultural and political rift, a rift in which some bodily and linguistic
comportments and competencies are legitimated while others are not. Bourdieu and
Wacquant write of this intimate relation and how it pertains to social class:
Language is a technique of the body, and linguistic . . . competency is a
dimension of bodily hexis in which the whole relation to the social world
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expresses itself . . . [This] suggests . . . that the bodily schema characteristic of a
social class determines the system of phonological traits that characterize a class
pronunciation, via . . . the ‘articulatory style’ . . . a lifestyle that has become
embodied . . . (149)
Thus, I rely on phenomenology and standpoint theory for their material and situated
focus, and their epistemological positions that consider lived experience and embodiment
as valid sources of legitimate knowledge and perception.

EPISTEMIC INJUSTICE
One of the most important concepts I am using in this thesis comes from Miranda
Fricker’s work on epistemic injustice. She defines epistemic injustice as “a wrong done to
someone specifically in their capacity as a knower” (1). The two main forms of epistemic
injustice that she identifies are testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice.
According to Fricker, testimonial injustice is caused by prejudices the hearer might hold
against the speaker resulting in a credibility deficit. In other words, the hearer may have
conscious or unconscious prejudices against the speaker, usually relating to identity,
causing them to perceive the speaker as having less credibility. Hermeneutical injustice,
on the other hand, involves a lack in interpretive resources available for making sense of
one’s social experiences. Both forms of epistemic injustice, testimonial and
hermeneutical, are relevant to the topic of the cultural and political gap between the
working-class and the educated elite.
In this project, I am primarily asserting that the educated elite hold prejudices
against working-class people, specifically working-class white men, causing them to
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disregard their experiences as lacking credibility despite the very real class oppression
they face. Of course, this is contextually dependent, and this disregard is reciprocated in
some ways in instances when a working-class person assumes someone with class
privilege has no idea what they are talking about. However, this reciprocation does not
amount to the alienation of an entire group of people; those with class privilege still have
more social power and influence over collective forms of social understanding. Again, I
want to be clear, I am not suggesting white working-class men are oppressed due to their
whiteness or maleness, however, it is not uncommon for critiques of white working-class
men to verge on being thinly-veiled classism. Disregarding the knowledge and
experiences of white working-class men in many regards is due to prejudices rooted in
class and this is an example of testimonial injustice.
Hermeneutic injustice is also relevant here. Some groups, according to Fricker,
experience a disadvantage in making sense of their own social experiences (146). Fricker
explains that those with “material power . . . will tend to have an influence in those
practices by which social meaning are generated” (147), meaning that those without
social and material power also might not have access to the interpretive resources for
making their social experiences legible. Following the reasoning of hermeneutic injustice,
this means that working-class people have less influence over collective social meaning
and less access to interpretive resources for their own social meaning. An example of one
type of interpretive resource is a legitimated form of speech. For instance, working-class
people might be rendered silent when faced with a formal linguistic market
like the one constituted by a linguistic survey or investigation ... [Popular
competence] ... is, as it were, annihilated. The reality of linguistic legitimacy
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consists precisely in the fact that dominated individuals are always under the
potential jurisdiction of formal law, even when they spend all their lives . . .
beyond its reach, so that when placed in a formal situation they are doomed to
silence or to the broken discourse which linguistic investigation also often
records. (Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power 71)
Charlesworth argues that language-use and speech are products of one’s social position or
condition, and that working-class people speak a delegitimated or devalued form of
language recognized as slang, which is a “dominated linguistic competence”
(Charlesworth 139). Charlesworth adds that this relates to a difficulty in political
representation as well because “the dominant language and . . . the institutions that
inscribe in bodies the dispositions to speak and perform it . . . conversely, [influence] the
dispositions to feel its legitimacy and authority” (213). Dominant language is more than
discursively powerful, it literally shapes bodily dispositions to feel its legitimacy and this
legitimacy is reified again and again.
With this being said, I want to trouble Fricker’s idea of hermeneutic injustice
slightly. While recognizing the merit of her work on hermeneutic injustice, I am weary of
any charge of marginalized people being unable to understand their own experiences
because I am coming from the perspective that lived experience is a legitimate source of
knowledge and that marginalized people are very capable of understanding their
experiences. In fact, as Patricia Hill Collins explains, “subordinate groups have long had
to use alternative ways to create independent self-definitions and self-valuations,” which
involves “using alternative ways of producing and validating knowledge” (252).
However, they may struggle to communicate in a way that renders their experiences
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legible to those not marginalized in the same way. Working-class people are generally at
least implicitly aware of “the objective hierarchy of habitus and linguistic competence,”
and that their language is not legitimated by educated bourgeois speech habits
(Charlesworth 139). So, I differ from Fricker’s understanding of hermeneutic injustice in
that I believe marginalized people understand their experiences even without the same
access to interpretive resources, they just lack the legitimated knowledge and speech to
legibly articulate their experiences to those outside their habitus 4. Even with my deviation
from Fricker’s understanding of hermeneutic injustice, it is still a type of epistemic
injustice committed against a marginalized group because they are denied the legitimacy
and tools needed to be legible to dominant classes and institutions, rendering it “a wrong
done to someone specifically in their capacity as a knower” (1).

METHODS FOR ANALYSIS
I am employing Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) because my goal is to first
analyze the texts themselves (Clinton’s speech, Trump’s response ad, Trump’s
comments, etc.), and then go beyond the texts to consider their institutional and
sociocultural contexts (Carvalho). Using this method of analysis aids in “expos[ing] the
causes and consequences of specific discourses and . . . denounce[s] the social, cultural or
political wrongs which they sustain” (Carvalho 162). CDA’s central claim is that
4

This does not deny the importance of having access to hermeneutic resources. Instead, I am
acknowledging that there are versions of hermeneutic resources useful for understanding one’s own
experiences that are either legitimated or subjugated by dominant classes and institutions. Access to
hermeneutic resources to understand one’s position in the world is important, but in order to be taken as
having epistemic credibility to those outside their own habitus, there is a certain amount of legibility
needed. Expanding the types of knowledge and knowers that are valued seeks to grant this legibility and
epistemic credibility.
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ideologies are embedded in all discourse, which both constitutes and reifies existing
institutions of power (Carvalho; Fairclough). CDA as a method is particularly appropriate
for understanding the political and cultural gap between the working-class and the
educated elite because it is a method that recognizes that “language is both a site of and a
stake in class struggle” (Fairclough 35). Thus, paying close attention to the textual
evidence of the underlying ideologies present in political discourse can be especially
fruitful for illustrating epistemic injustice, and both recognizing and understanding this
political and cultural gap.
CDA can be approached through a three-tiered method involving description,
interpretation, and explanation of a given text (Fairclough). Description is used to
identify the linguistic associations, interpretation involves the pragmatic and intertextual
elements, and explanation relates to broader socio-cultural conditions (Fairclough). The
framework for analyzing media discourse with CDA is broken down into two main
components: textual analysis and contextual analysis (Carvalho). I will elaborate on what
makes up these two components below.
Textual analysis includes a text’s layout and structural organization, objects,
actors, language, grammar and rhetoric, discursive strategies, and ideological standpoints
(Carvalho). A text’s layout and structural organization is important for which elements
will be noticed based off of the organization, impacting how the audience might perceive
or interpret the issue (Carvalho). Objects are the themes or topics constructed by the text,
which emphasize the notion that “discourse constitutes rather than just ‘refers to’ the
realities at stake” (Carvalho 167). Actors are the social agents present or referenced in the
text. They may be individuals or institutions (Carvalho). Language, grammar and rhetoric

43

refers to word choice or vocabulary, and the writing style (Carvalho). Discursive
strategies relate to how a text is manipulated or framed to impact audience perception,
which includes which elements are included and excluded, and how those elements are
arranged (Carvalho). Finally, ideological standpoints are the implicit and explicit social
and political values or stances present in a text (Carvalho).
Contextual analysis includes comparative-synchronic analysis and historicaldiachronic analysis (Carvalho). Comparative-synchronic analysis involves comparing a
text to other texts from around the same time that cover the same issue (Carvalho).
Historical-diachronic analysis, on the other hand, examines the broader political, social,
and economic context of a text (Carvalho). It also considers the evolution of discourse
over a period of time (Carvalho). Understanding the historical context for how an issue
developed over time is valuable for better understanding the present (Carvalho).
I will return to these concepts in the following chapter where I apply CDA to
Hillary Clinton calling half of Trump’s supporters a “basket of deplorables,” Donald
Trump’s television advertisement responding to Clinton’s comments, and Trump’s
responding comments in a speech given in Asheville, North Carolina. I have chosen these
textual examples because they are “critical discourse moments” (Carvalho 173).
According to Carvalho, such moments challenge established discursive positions and are
defined through political activity and socially relevant events (166). For now, I
emphasize my understanding of discourse as “a site of struggle, where forces of social
(re)production and contestation are played out” (Lazar 4). By analyzing these texts and
their relation to the cultural and political divide between the working-class and the
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educated elite, I hope to make clear the overt and subtle presence of the “renderings of
ideological assumptions and power relations” (13).
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CHAPTER 3:
DEPLORABLE, “HARD WORKING PEOPLE LIKE YOU”

OVERVIEW
In this chapter, I use critical discourse analysis to provide a reading of 2016
Presidential Democratic candidate Hillary Clinton’s comments describing half of Donald
Trump's supporters as being a “basket of deplorables,” Trump’s responding comments,
and Trump’s responding television advertisement. Following Clinton's comments came
both Far-Right backlash and the reclaiming of the term “deplorable” among Trump's
supporters. I analyze these textual examples because they are “critical discourse
moments” of larger discursive chains that help illustrate the concepts and claims I have
detailed in the previous chapters. The goals of this chapter are to first, summarize the
texts, and second, critically analyze and discuss them.
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THE TEXTS

CLINTON’S REMARKS
On September 9, 2016, at a private fundraiser, the LGBT for Hillary Gala,
Democratic Presidential candidate Hillary Clinton committed a large gaffe that
potentially could have cost her the presidency. Before the crowd, standing at a podium
with the words “Stronger Together” stretching across the front, Clinton made the
infamously unpopular remark. “We are living in a volatile political environment,” she
explained to nodding heads in the crowd. She continued, “You know, to just be grossly
generalistic, you could put half of Trump’s supporters into what I call the basket of
deplorables. Right?” She paused as the room filled with laughter and applause. She
continued again:
The racist, sexist, homophobic, xenophobic, Islamaphobic (sic)— you name it.
And unfortunately there are people like that. And he has lifted them up . . . Now,
some of those folks — they are irredeemable, but thankfully they are not
America. But the other basket . . . of people are people who feel that the
government has let them down, the economy has let them down, nobody cares
about them, nobody worries about what happens to their lives and their futures,
and they’re just desperate for change. It doesn’t really even matter where it comes
from. They don’t buy everything he says, but he seems to hold out some hope that
their lives will be different. They won’t wake up and see their jobs disappear, lose
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a kid to heroine (sic), feel like they’re in a dead-end. Those are people we have to
understand and empathize with as well. 5
The second half of Clinton’s statement perhaps does not get enough attention, but enough
damage had been done by the first half. She committed the fatal mistake of criticizing the
voters rather than the opponent. Aside from this error in judgment, what in particular
makes this statement sting? Further, what discourses do Clinton’s comments derive from
or refer to that render them so worthy of being recognized as a misstep deserving of the
label “a political gift,” as Clinton later referred to it in her memoir What Happened
(413)?
Some of Clinton’s supporters might have speculated that the statement was
received so poorly because it was so perfectly accurate. Or in the very least, it was guilt
by association; if someone supported a candidate who has demonstrated himself to be a
racist, sexist, Islamophobic, and xenophobic person, then by extension they would be as
well. Perhaps it was emphasis on half of Trump’s supporters being deplorable. If almost
sixty-three million people ended up voting for Trump (Federal Elections Commission),
did that mean that roughly thirty million Americans would qualify as deplorable in
Clinton’s mind?
The most damaging fact of Clinton’s statement is that it identified individuals as
deplorable rather than the beliefs or stances that they hold as deplorable. Worse, she was
not simply describing individuals as “deplorable” by using it as an adjective to describe
one particular characteristic of a person or group; rather, she used it in the form of a
noun, suggesting that it is the essence of what these people are (Merriam-Webster).
5

For a full transcript of Clinton’s speech, see Appendix A.
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Further, she identified them as “irredeemable.” Did Clinton mean to invoke such an
image of Trump’s supporters? One could only speculate, but what her gaffe certainly
does is capture the sentiment held by many of the “class blind” educated elite
(Charlesworth).

TRUMP’S RESPONSE AD
The Trump campaign quickly realized the opportunity and seized it with a 30
second response ad airing in Ohio, Pennsylvania, North Carolina, and Florida (E.
Collins). Choosing to air the ad in these states specifically is important considering the
economic demographics of each state, the presence of a rural population, and finally that
these states are recognized as swing states with an ability to determine the outcome of the
presidential election.
The ad opens with Clinton standing at the podium, arms stretched outwards while
a female narrator sets the tone of the ad as emphasizing class, beginning with “speaking
to wealthy donors . . . ” In an effort to demonstrate the sheer number of people Clinton
allegedly saw as deplorable, a wide shot of a large crowd at a Trump rally is pictured
behind the word “deplorable” while the narrator states that “Hillary Clinton called tens of
millions of Americans deplorable.” In several of the following short frames, diverse
groups of individuals are shown as Clinton lists off the adjectives “sexist,”
“homophobic,” “xenophobic,” and “Islamophobic.” The first close shot is of two white
men in hard hats at a rally, immediately invoking the association of white working-class
men with the term “deplorable.” A succession of clips feature white women, women of
color, and veterans respectively while the narrator says “people like you, you, and you—
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deplorable.” The ad concludes with the narrator asking “you know what’s deplorable?” as
the words appear before an image of Clinton, and the narrator answers “Hillary Clinton
viciously demonizing hard-working people like you.”

TRUMP’S RESPONDING COMMENTS
On September 13, 2016, a couple of days after Clinton made her initial comments,
during a rally in Asheville, North Carolina, Trump responded to Clinton’s remarks.
While my opponent slanders you as deplorable and irredeemable, I call you hardworking American patriots who love your country and want a better future for all
of our people. You are mothers and fathers, soldiers and sailors, carpenters and
welders. You are Democrats, Independents, and Republicans. Above all else, you
are Americans – and you are entitled to leadership that honors you, cherishes you,
and defends you. Every American is entitled to be treated with dignity and respect
in our country . . . [Our supporters are] united by their deep and sophisticated
understanding of how our political system has abandoned the people . . . Hillary
Clinton spoke with hatred in her heart for these working class Americans. She
looks down on them . . . on all the people who make her life possible . . . the
carpenters, plumbers, electricians, lawyers and accountants . . . the police officers,
soldiers, and firefighters supporting our campaign . . . people who cook her meals,
drive her cars, and dig the coal that powers her electricity. She called these
Americans every name in the book -- racist, sexist, xenophobic, Islamophobic -she said they were not even American.6
6

For Donald Trump’s full speech in response, please refer to Appendix B
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Trump’s response seized the opportunity to further cement the association of Clinton’s
“basket of deplorables” comment with the working-class.

ANALYSIS
Referring back to the major tenets of critical discourse analysis, I would like to
analyze Hillary Clinton’s words alongside the Trump response ad and his responding
comments. To do so, I turn my attention to the features of textual analysis, which include
a text’s layout and structural organization, objects, actors, language, grammar and
rhetoric, discursive strategies, and ideological standpoints, and contextual analysis, which
includes comparative-synchronic analysis and historical-diachronic analysis (Carvalho).

LAYOUT, OBJECTS, AND ACTORS
The three texts can be described according to general elements such as the layout,
objects, and actors. A text’s layout and structural organization is concerned with which
elements will be noticed based off of the organization, thus impacting how the audience
might perceive or interpret the issues at hand (Carvalho). Objects are themes or topics
constructed by the text, emphasizing the idea that “discourse constitutes rather than just
‘refers to’ the realities at stake” (Carvalho 167). Objects are constructed by Clinton’s
statement, Trump’s responding comments, and his response ad. Actors are the social
agents, including individuals or institutions, that are presented or referenced in the text
(Carvalho).
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Clinton’s speech at the LGBT for Hillary Gala is primarily organized to compare
and contrast herself to her opponent. She does this through the theme of LGBT rights and
discussing issues that she considers most pressing to the LGBT community. Another
theme is that of urgency and perseverance, repeating phrases like “we know what we are
up against” or “there are only 60 days left to make our case.” There is also the theme of
caution for the future if she is not elected president, with her hyperbolically claiming that
she is “all that stands between us and the apocalypse.” The themes and social agents most
remembered from this speech, however, are the two “baskets” that Trump’s supporters
can be divided into; the “basket of deplorables,” and those who feel let down by the
economy and government. Thus, a final notable theme is of the dangers Trump’s
supporters present for the future of the country.
Trump’s responding comments are similarly organized in a manner that compares
and contrasts him to his opponent. Although he focuses on themes relating to the moral
dignity, honor, and respect that all Americans are deserving of. He does this by appealing
to institutions such as the family and military, as well as the working-class, saying “[you]
are mothers and fathers, soldiers and sailors, carpenters and welders.” He also does this
by empathizing with the those who have lost their jobs and by recognizing individuals in
a number of occupations, particularly those with blue-collar jobs. A major theme he relies
on is the interests of “the people,” ordinary people. In fact, in his short speech, he refers
to “the people” in this way six times. While referring to “the people” he also makes a
firm distinction between the interests of common people and the interests of the wealthy
and corrupt elite of Washington, the group he depicts Clinton as belonging to. He
simultaneously appeals to the moral dignity of the working-class, claiming that he “will
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be their champion,” while stressing that Clinton “looks down” on all of the working-class
people “who make her life possible.” Through doing this, he is intentionally initiating
himself, marking himself as one of them, and Clinton as the opposite, an aloof and
clueless elite insider.
Finally, multiple elements in Trump’s response ad are organized in such a way so
as to emphasize key ideas to influence the audience’s perception of Hillary Clinton and
her initial statement. Important to the layout of the ad is that it begins by establishing a
class-related tone and theme in acknowledging that Clinton’s words were spoken to
“wealthy donors” at a fundraiser, and it concludes with the words “Hillary Clinton
viciously demonizing hard working people like you,” both appearing and being spoken
aloud. The use of a wide shot with a large crowd and the word “DEPLORABLE”
appearing and stretching across the frame, followed by multiple close shots of different
groups, changing with each critical epithet Clinton uses, is intended to convince the
audience that Clinton has insulted a wide array of people, and importantly, morally good
people. The ad references Hillary Clinton and wealthy people, but also women, workingclass men, veterans, and to some extent, people of color. Thus, a theme of diversity is
arguably present or at least implied.

LANGUAGE, GRAMMAR, RHETORIC, AND DISCURSIVE STRATEGIES
I am combining the categories of language, grammar, and rhetoric with discursive
strategies because it is difficult to separate these interconnected concepts that are so
deeply interpellated with one another. Language, grammar, and rhetoric refers to the
vocabulary and writing style present in a text (Carvalho). Discursive strategies refer to
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manipulation or framing of the text which involves not only what is included, but also
what is excluded (Carvalho).
The rhetorical choices in language and vocabulary are particularly interesting
between Clinton’s statement and Trump’s responding comments and ad. The two
campaigns demonstrate through these texts a clear difference in the intended audience by
resting on distinct variations in the relation to language. For example, like previously
mentioned, the word “deplorable” is itself important in that it is not an example of typical
working-class speech, especially in the peculiar noun form in which Clinton used it
(Merriam-Webster). It was not uncommon for liberals and progressives to actually joke
about how a number of people for whom the term was intended probably had to first look
it up. Online searches for the meaning of the word “deplorable,” an adjective meaning
“lamentable” or “deserving of censure or contempt,” did in fact spike considerably
following Clinton’s use of it (Merriam-Webster). Likewise, Clinton resorts to a laundrylist of terms, “racist,” “sexist,” “homophobic,” “xenophobic,” and “Islamophobic,”
recognized as “political correctness” on the Right, and emblematic of a Leftist relation to
language in the reliance upon sophisticated, intellectual, and theoretical “signifying
terminology” (Proudman 201). Such terminology, Proudman states, allows for groups to
recognize one another through the signifying act of mutual intellectual belonging,
by implying a shared intelligence, by dropping the name of a textual authority, or
by deploying thick, intellectually laden, heavily allusive terminology . . . at once
to signal allies that ‘we’ really understand what is going on and to exclude and
stigmatize opponents who do not know or do not accept the ideological
implications of the language in use. The use of such . . . terminology designates as
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respectable, and thus inside the group in question, those able to participate in the
discussion, while simultaneously excluding those outside the cognoscenti. (203)
This sense of belonging is further demonstrated in Clinton’s informal use of “you name
it” following the list of condemning epithets. It might also suggest that, as the in-group
discussing all of these negative traits, she is speaking to those who are on the same page
as her, that this terminology is common between them, and none of these terms apply to
anyone within this group, only to those outside of it.
The terms that she uses to describe the “basket of deplorables” are also important
in that they take on the form of a list. According to Norman Fairclough, in his
monumental work Language and Power, lists are important in that they set up an
association between each of the items listed, but do not necessarily explicitly state how
they are associated. Additionally, what is not included in a list is significant because it
constructs a notion of what is to be disassociated. Listing pulls in the audience and
requires work on their part to follow the speaker’s line of reasoning. Notably, what is
missing from Clinton’s list is any term referencing class, despite having listed terms that
are easily understood to be in reference to race, gender, sexuality, national origin, and
religion (specifically Islam). Implicitly, this inclusion and exclusion of terms listed might
account for why it was perceived that Clinton was denigrating working-class people
specifically as a “basket of deplorables.” Trump similarly uses lists in his responding
comments, but ones that are more blatantly associated with the working-class—through
the naming of working-class occupations:
Hillary Clinton spoke with hatred in her heart for these working class Americans.
She looks down on . . . the people who make her life possible . . . the carpenters,
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plumbers, electricians, lawyers and accountants. . . the police officers, soldiers,
and firefighters . . . the people who cook her meals, drive her cars, and dig the
coal that powers her electricity.
Although lawyers and even some accountants might not be generally thought of as
working-class, every other profession he names in this speech is coded as stereotypically
working-class.
While Trump’s response ad relies on a different relationship to language, it is
similar to Clinton’s speech in its attempts to articulate relationality and belonging,
particularly emphasizing the invocation of the pronoun “you.” Fairclough identifies the
significance and prominence of the direct address of individuals through the use of the
pronoun “you” in its ability to convey relational intimacy and connection with the
intended audience. “You” is “used to register solidarity and commonality of experience
in working-class speech” (Fairclough 180). According to Fairclough, because of the
“diverse . . . composition of mass-media audiences, the speaker . . . has to postulate, and
set up a subject position for . . . a typified ‘ideal’ hearer” (178). In his analysis of another
authoritarian populist, Margaret Thatcher, he determines her ideal hearer to be an
“ordinary person” or a member of “the people” (179). Thus, Thatcher’s use of the
pronoun “you,” in speaking to the experiences, beliefs, and aspirations of “the people,”
establishes a relationship which places herself in with “the ordinary person” as well
(179). Similarly, the use of “you” in Trump’s response ad attempts to establish solidarity
and a relationship between Trump himself and the ideal hearer whom Clinton has
insulted, serving the double function of presenting Trump as “one of the people” and,
conversely, Clinton as a member of the wealthy elite. Interestingly, in one of the final
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frames of the consecutive deployment of “you” in Trump’s ad, he is himself featured
distributing supplies to flood victims alongside Mike Pence, as fellow members of “the
people,” whom, it is suggested, Clinton has called “deplorable.”
In addition to bringing attention to a collective solidarity among those who are
presumably “deplorable,” “you” may also function in the singular form, drawing in
individual viewers. Fairclough refers to this quality as “synthetic personalization,” or a
“compensatory tendency to give the impression of treating each of the people ‘handled’
en masse as an individual” (52). This is especially significant in this context because it
tugs on the very personal issue of feeling disempowered politically. Charlesworth
explains that oftentimes working-class people feel alienated from politics, because they
“cannot recognize their plight in the discourses supplied by politicians” (212). Workingclass people may feel that their experiential knowledge does not qualify as “politics”
because, to them, their experiences are just ordinary life (Charlesworth). Because they
lack the legitimated linguistics and articulatory comportment associated with expression
in the political domain, and because they have internalized the feelings of incompetence,
they might ignore the political realm all together (Charlesworth). But for political
representation to materialize, their “corporeal sense of the world” depends upon a “selfconscious representation of their interests” (212). This invocation of the individualizing
“you,” paired with the corporeal “hard working people” in the ad’s clause “hard working
people like you,” provides this transition from a working-class corporeal sense of the
world to a literal self-conscious representation of their interests. Thus, such an invocation
of “you” provides the political efficacy that working-class people have historically felt
they have lacked or been denied by dominant institutions and the dominant class.
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Trump’s responding comments also play on the usage of “you” and specifically
rely on the invocation of “the people,” like previously mentioned. Comparing his
responding comments to Clinton’s initial speech, his delivery is more direct in that he
more frequently directly addresses the audience as “you,” while Clinton is more likely to
say “I” or “we.” In several cases where she does use “you,” it could easily be replaced
with the impersonal “one,” whose relational value can be a euphemistic way of saying
“I,” which can be interpreted as “a delicate way of stating a self-centered perception of
interests” (for example, “you could put half of his supporters into . . . the basket of
deplorables” easily can be “one could put . . . ” or “I could put . . . ”) (Fairclough 180).
Trump’s comments on the other hand are more direct; “I want to tell you what I am going
to do to make your life better,” or “I call you hardworking American patriots who love
your country.” In the same speech, he says that Clinton “talks about people like they're
objects, not human beings.” In the sense that her language, in comparison to his, can
more easily be read as hypothetical rather than personal and direct, this claim is not
unfounded.
Lastly, what is worth noting are the portions of Clinton’s initial statement which
are included in Trump’s response ad in comparison to which portions are excluded. What
should be immediately obvious for anyone who has read or listened to Clinton’s full
statement is that a large portion of it is excluded from the response ad put out by Trump’s
campaign. After all, she refers to Trump’s supporters fitting into two baskets. The “basket
of deplorables” has received plenty of attention, but its counterpart, “the other basket,”
including those who feel alienated and forgotten by their government, who have
legitimate concerns, and are deserving of empathy—that basket has not received the same
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attention. This other portion was also rarely acknowledged by media coverage and
political commentary on the incident. This is a very deliberate example of framing by
what is included and what is excluded. While Trump does acknowledge both “baskets” in
his responding comments in Asheville, North Carolina, the content to be shared in
multiple commercial airings across Ohio, Pennsylvania, North Carolina, and Florida
included only the “basket of deplorables,” not the other basket of people whom Clinton
called on her supporters to empathize with (E. Collins).

IDEOLOGICAL STANDPOINTS
Multiple ideological standpoints are present in Clinton’s speech, Trump’s
responding comments, and his response ad. Some are quite overt while others are more
subtle. In discussing the ideological standpoints, I will jump between the three texts I am
analyzing because they are contextually tied to one another. According to Carvalho,
ideological standpoints are the implicit and explicit social and political values or stances
present in a text. Ideological standpoints take on the quality of an assumption which
functions as “a means of legitimizing existing social relations and differences of power . .
. through the recurrence of ordinary, familiar ways of behaving which take these relations
and power differences for granted” (Fairclough 2). This is not an exhaustive account of
every ideology present in these texts because not every ideology readily pertains to the
topic of this thesis. What I do provide is an overview of several of the primary ideologies
present which are at the heart of the issue of epistemic injustice. These important
ideologies include, on one hand, a neoliberal and meritocratic emphasis on hard work,
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morality, dignity, and honor, traits we will see coded as white and masculine, and on the
other, elitism and the idea that working-class people are ignorant.
First, some general ideologies present in Clinton’s initial comments: Clinton’s
speech emphasizes rights-based ideologies for LGBT people and social justice ideologies
interested in women’s rights, civil rights, racial equality, multi-culturalism, proimmigration, and even to a lesser degree, support for the military. While her critique of
those who would belong in “the basket of deplorables” was probably directed towards
white-supremacists and the alt-right who have been emboldened by Trump’s rhetoric, its
intertextual reference to negative discourse regarding the stereotypically ignorant,
bigoted, racist, sexist, homophobic, xenophobic, Islamophobic, white working-class man
is implicitly present.
Trump does attempt to shed the racist label in his response ad and in his
responding comments. In his ad, diverse groups of people are shown including Latinx
people, a black man, an Orthodox Jewish man, and otherwise racially ambiguous people,
suggesting that more than just “racist, sexist, homophobic, xenophobic, Islamophobic,”
white, working-class men support him. In his responding comments in Asheville, North
Carolina, he talks about people of color, specifically referring to a statistic on AfricanAmerican poverty rates. Although he does so immediately after mentioning his plans for
reforming “inner cities.” Then he follows up with a statistic on gun violence in Chicago.
His general message to black Americans is that, in urban areas, Democrats have been in
power for decades and that their lives are not necessarily any better for it. Because they
have nothing to lose, they should vote for Trump.
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Clearly, there are some issues here with conflating inner cities with blackness,
poverty, and violence, associations Trump has been criticized for invoking multiple
times, both during his campaign and continuing into his presidency (Ye Hee Lee).
However, the placement of his appeal to black Americans is interesting in its implicit
embedding of gendered and raced ideas. The phrase “hard working people” is used in
both Trump’s response ad and responding comments. To refer back to the intersecting
axes of identity and “the working man,” Roediger argues that the term “working man”
invokes an implicit whiteness and sense of masculinity. Keeping this in mind, the
repeated phrase “hard working people” in Trump’s responding ad and comments could be
coded as white and masculine, implicitly subscribing to an ideology of white people
working hard and people of color being lazy. It is curious that throughout Trump’s
speech on the dignity of hard working Americans, he partitions his statements to the
black community, imploring them to “Give Donald J. Trump a chance,” off in a short
section near the end of his speech, separate from talk of dignity and hard work. Nowhere
else in his speech does he mention people of color. This type of distancing, while
implicit, furthers an ideological standpoint that understands morality, goodness, and
forms of respectable masculinity as being traits associated with whiteness, and if read
through Roediger’s point, this whiteness implies maleness.
Trump’s response ad and responding comments contain a heavy reliance on the
narrative of being hard working, which is a powerful ideological standpoint that
influences Trump’s appeal to working-class people. Sociologists have suggested that
working-class people develop their self-worth in moral terms (Lamont; Sherman). With
obstacles preventing upward mobility, working-class people find value in moral order

61

derived from hard work, paying bills and taxes, caring for their children, and caring for
others (Lamont et al.; Pini and Conway; Sherman). These duties are traits of the
“disciplined self,” embraced by white working-class men and many working-class men of
color (Lamont). Through the lens of the “disciplined self,” value is manifested through
meritocratic ideals of “hard work and commitment, upholding family responsibilities, and
performing the role of the provider and protector” (Lamont et al. S162). Of particular
salience is the association of hard working people with moral dignity, an association
rooted in discourses of meritocracy. For example, after surveying seventy-three of
Trump’s formal speeches on the 2016 campaign trail, Lamont, Yun Park, and AyalaHurtado identified that Trump appealed to the white working-class by raising their moral
status through repeatedly describing them as hardworking, and acknowledging their
concerns about professionals, the elite, and politicians, among a number of things. We
can see that Trump’s response ad is in alignment with their assessment, as are his
responding comments to Clinton’s initial statement.
Different categories of individuals representing moral goodness are depicted
throughout the ad including veterans, working-class people, and Trump, as he is seen
helping victims of a natural disaster. It is clear that invoking an ideology of morality is
important to this ad and perceived as important to the intended audience of the ad. This
point is made even more explicit by Trump’s responding comments made in Asheville,
North Carolina. In this brief speech, Trump says the words “respect,” “dignity,” or
“honor” eight times, he says “jobs” ten times, and he says “work” or “working” five
times, including the phrase “hard working” or “working hard.” The prominence and
frequency of these words effectively establish the perspective that Clinton’s comment
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was in reference to hardworking members of the working-class. With the association of
hard work with virtue and dignity, one can only wonder where this leaves those who are
physically disabled or unable to work for other reasons.
For those that belong in Clinton’s proverbial “other basket,” those who feel let
down and forgotten by the government and by the economy, and as Trump summarized
in his responding comments, as “having run out of options,” they are deserving of
empathy according to Clinton. However, as William’s articulates, empathy is often
perceived as condescension. This attempt of showing a kinder sentiment towards those in
“the other basket” could be interpreted not as empathy, but as pity and insulting the
intelligence of the white working-class individuals supporting Trump. White workingclass people are not privy to pity, and Trump capitalized on this fact by returning to the
rhetoric of hard work, dignity, and honor. Between pity and being irredeemably
deplorable, there is no difference except in that rejecting pity is more dignified.
In Trump’s responding comments, he acknowledges the knowledge and
understanding that the working-class has of the country’s political workings. He even
flatters them, calling their understanding “sophisticated”:
Whether our supporters have lost a job to a factory moved to another country, or
whether they’re a captain in the police department, or a teacher at a local school,
they are united by their deep and sophisticated understanding of how our political
system has abandoned the people.
By calling the understanding of individuals in these professions “sophisticated,” and
repeatedly claiming that Clinton “looks down on them,” he is deliberately playing right
into the narrative, made even more opportunistically accessible by Clinton’s ill-advised
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comments, that the educated elite think that working-class people are ignorant, a narrative
which feeds the process of epistemic injustice. When the white working-class see
themselves through the eyes of the dominant class; when their perceptual horizon is
expanded and they have access to the hermeneutic resources to see themselves as an
object7, to see themselves as deplorable, and to face the condescension and derision, they
come to imbue
a sense of themselves that they must live up against: a fracturing, damaging sense
of self learnt through . . . the institutions . . . [and] interactions of everyday life’
. . . [inscribing] a . . . sense of the social order that makes visible the extent to
which: ‘Social divisions become principles of division, organizing the image of
the social world’ . . . ‘Objective limits acquired by experience of objective limits’
amount to a ‘sense of one’s place’ . . . [leading one] to exclude themselves from
[that] . . . which they are excluded. (Charlesworth 248)
Put simply, after seeing themselves the way the educated elite see them, they elect to
exclude themselves from a domain which, by their interpretation, they are already
excluded. If Clinton did not want their vote, then she would not get their vote, essentially.
The action of excluding themselves from what they have already been excluded from is
an example of how the social and political division between the white working-class and
the educated elite actually reifies itself. While Trump appealed to the white working-class
by appearing to raise up their situated knowledge as legitimate, Clinton either saw them
7

Here, I am referring to Linda Martín Alcoff’s notion of identity as horizon and a matter of perceptual
access, which I think complements Miranda Fricker’s understanding of hermeneutic epistemic injustice, in
which the knower does not have full access to or a contextualizing understanding of one’s social
positioning due to a lack in hermeneutical resources. My use of “object” is in the Heideggerian sense, to
objectify one’s self and attempt to reflexively make sense of things, to “'throw themselves against' a pure
discovering - that is, that they can become 'objects'” (414).

64

as deplorable or to be pitied, as far as they were concerned. This was the dignity in
embracing the title “deplorable.”

DISCUSSION
It is important to consider the target audiences and contexts for both of the
candidates. Clinton was speaking to private donors who were presumably liberal. Trump,
on the other hand, was speaking directly to working-class people because it was that
demographic who was perceived to be targeted by Clinton’s remarks. Rhetorical
strategies that are effective for one audience are not necessarily effective for the other.
One example of this is Trump’s use of extensive boundary work (Lamont et al.).
Boundary work “feeds hierarchies of worth and status as individuals create
categorizations and distinctions between people” (S161). These symbolic boundaries
contribute to the construction of social boundaries (Lamont et al.). Trump employs
boundary work through his rhetoric, associating himself with working-class people and
separating himself from the establishment, which he has described as corrupt (Lamont et
al.). By focusing on the working-class, attributing working-class downward mobility to
structural factors, and drawing distinct boundaries between both those above and those
below, Trump effectively catered to what resonates most with the white working-class
(Lamont et al.). In fact, his boundary work actually mirrored that of white working-class
men, who develop what Lamont calls a “moral matrix,” to help “maximize their worth in
relation to ‘people above’ and ‘people below’” (Lamont et al. S162). Thus, Trump’s
boundary work symbolically bridged the gap between a wealthy businessman like
himself and white working-class people (Lamont et al.).
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Jonathan Haidt presents an interesting assessment in the differences between
liberal and conservative politics through the use of political psychology and moral
foundations theory. Moral foundations theory claims that people think and make
decisions that are based in ideas of morality rather than reason (Haidt). So, with that
being said, Haidt argues that people make political decisions based on intuition. People
do reason, but often times they reach a conclusion first, and then develop the arguments
to justify that conclusion after the fact (Haidt). Haidt considers how morality varies
across cultures, but there are some themes that tend to recur. These themes of morality
include care, fairness, loyalty, authority, sanctity, and liberty8 (Haidt). Haidt argues that
Liberals tend to construct morality with only three of these foundational themes, mainly
the theme of care, and also the themes of fairness and liberty. In comparison,
Conservatives derive their morality from all six themes (Haidt).
I mention Lamont’s research on the boundary work in Trump’s speeches and
Haidt’s work on the foundations of conservative and liberal morality to suggest that
Trump and Clinton’s audiences, in the contexts I have analyzed, differ, and the
candidate's rhetorical approaches that are successful with each audience also differ.
Trump could afford to mirror the boundary work of white working-class men, and this
approach was beneficial for attracting the support of his intended audience. Clinton’s
engagement in distinguishing between good and evil baskets of Trump supporters, on the
other hand, was perceived as “divisive.” Furthermore, the gap that Clinton had to bridge
8

Haidt elaborates on each of these recurrent themes, explaining that care, and its opposite, harm, are
associated with virtues like kindness or nurturance. Fairness and its opposite, cheating, relate to reciprocal
altruism and proportionality. Loyalty, and its opposite, betrayal, are associated with patriotism or selfsacrifice for the group. Authority, and its opposite, subversion, are associated with leadership, followership,
deference to legitimate authority, and respect for tradition. Sanctity, and its opposite, degradation refer to
efforts to live in a noble way and protect the body and mind from perceived contaminants. Liberty, and its
opposite, oppression, involve how people resent or react to those who oppress them or limit their liberty.
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in her rhetoric, in order to appeal to white working-class men, was much larger than for
Trump if we consider Haidt’s moral foundations. Were Clinton’s remarks successful in
any way? Most likely, no. Because Clinton’s remarks influenced a larger shift in
undecided voters to support Trump in the final stretch, it is clear that her comments were
not well received outside of her own intended audience of liberal, LGBT private donors
(Hessan). While the comment might have had some mobilizing potential for the
Democratic Party, it ultimately deterred undecided voters and solidified white workingclass support for Trump.
Why are Trump’s words received as genuine rather than condescending by his
intended audience of working-class people? In some cases, calling someone’s
understanding of something “sophisticated” could be perceived as condescending.
Describing something in relation to the working-class as “sophisticated” could in itself
seem ingenuine due to that kind of language rarely being used to describe the workingclass. The reason for this difference in the way Trump’s words are received compared to
Clinton’s again can be traced back to a classed difference in relation to language, so
deeply imbedded in working-class comportment that it influences the affective senses 9
that interpret things such as honesty; interpretations shaped through their habitus and
socialization, shaping the mind and body that is perceiving, and thus shaping their
surrounding social environments as well (Distinction, Bourdieu; Charlesworth). More
specifically, these learned dispositions emphasize the association of honesty, sincerity,
and trustworthiness with outspokenness, bluntness, the refusal to euphemism-laden

9

This is a phenomenological idea, if we recall that “Language is a technique of the body, and linguistic . . .
competency is a dimension of bodily hexis in which the whole relation to the social world expresses itself”
(Bourdieu and Wacquant 149).
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speech, and the eschewal of proper etiquette as defined by the dominant classes and
institutions (Charlesworth). Bourdieu explains it well, stating that
it is the free-speech and language of the heart which make the true ‘nice guy’,
blunt, straightforward, unbending, honest, genuine, ‘straight down the line,’ . . . as
opposed to everything that is pure form, done only for form’s sake; it is freedom
and the refusal of complications, as opposed to respect for all the forms and
formalities spontaneously perceived as instruments of distinction and power. On .
. . these world views, there is no neutral view-point; what for some is shameless
and slovenly, for others is straightforward, unpretentious; familiarity is for some
the most absolute form of recognition, . . . a trusting openness, a relation of equal
to equal. (Distinction 199)
These improper qualities suggest that Trump is “one who can be known and thus relied
upon to take a certain stance” (234). Because he had already established himself as the
outspoken candidate who was not afraid to offend, his words were received by workingclass people as genuine and therefore not condescending.
Clinton, on the other hand, represents the image that the Democratic Party has
attempted to procure for itself: progressive and inclusive to those marginalized due to
their race, gender, or sexuality. Regardless of how accurately this image depicts reality, it
is an image that does not include white working-class men (Reich). The Democratic Party
that was once recognized as the party of working-class people has eroded along with the
labor unions that helped sustain it over the last three decades, with both Democrat and
Republican leaders embracing neoliberal policies (Reich). Thus, Clinton came to
symbolize the increasingly villainized “political correctness,” whose “hyper-correction”
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was read by many white working-class men as untrustworthy (Charlesworth 226).
Charlesworth mentions that working-class people “tellingly equate” these bodily
and linguistic comportments of propriety with teachers, librarians, city council members,
government employees, state officials, and politicians (216). These occupations are all
associated with epistemic authority granted through the nominating power of government
and education, the social institutions of legitimate knowledge (P.H. Collins). They are
also associated with the public sector, which has lost favor with the conservative
movement through what Cramer calls a “rural resentment of public employees,” due to
the prevailing myths that associate public employees with urban areas or urban concerns,
and suggest that public employees make more money than they deserve (127). Of course,
regardless of the accuracy of this assessment of public employees, these negative beliefs
about the public sector serve a political purpose, promoting privatization (Cramer).
Cramer also notes an aversion to “university types,” because of the belief that they are
not hard working people, as well as the rural perception that university employees,
especially professors, are associated with what is urban and, thus, must look down on
rural people (131).
Cramer acknowledges that these rural and conservative perceptions are, in part,
due to “an aversion to elitism” (131). However, while Cramer identifies these political
divisions as primarily being due to the urban and rural divide, I think they can also be
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linked to an epistemic divide10. Continued subjugation of working-class knowledge is a
contributing factor in the backlash of what some can only see as “anti-intellectualism,”
but to call it that misses the point. It is a reaction to having one’s experiences and
knowledge rendered irrelevant, having one’s thoughts “suppressed by prevailing
knowledge validation processes,” and the determining that one’s knowledge is not
legitimate, but rather, subjugated knowledge (P.H. Collins 254). Recourse to insulting the
intelligence of white working-class men functions to reify institutional powers with the
authority to determine a hierarchy of knowledge, and a hierarchy of whose standpoints
count as valid. The implications stretch so far as to even call into question one’s human
worth, a fundamental consequence of epistemic injustice 11 (Fricker).

10

This is in reference to Miranda Fricker’s notion of epistemic injustice, and as I further explain, Patricia
Hill Collins’s concepts of legitimated and subjugated knowledges, intrinsic to her construction of a new
kind of epistemology, one she identifies as a black feminist standpoint, that includes valuing the meaning
derived from concrete experience, the ethics of care, and the ethics of personal accountability. It is an
epistemology that challenges the dominant epistemology (created by elite white men) that renders the
experiential knowledge of marginalized groups illegitimate. This standpoint epistemology proposes that
there are multiple standpoints formed from multiple points of situated knowledge, each acknowledging
their access to a partial truth, and the importance of recognizing the partial perspectives in others which are
necessary for piecing together the whole (P.H. Collins 270).
11
Fricker describes epistemic injustice as being “wronged in one’s capacity as a knower [which] is to be
wronged in a capacity essential to human value . . . [bearing] a social meaning to the effect that the subject
is less than fully human” (44).

70

CHAPTER 4:
CONCLUSION: A WAY FORWARD?

OVERVIEW
In this final chapter, I discuss the broader implications of epistemic injustice and
the gap between the white working-class and the educated elite, as well as what is at
stake in the present political moment as it pertains to the epistemic injustice of white
working-class men. I suggest some strategies for moving forward and addressing this
political and cultural rift, and I discuss ideas for future research on this topic.

WHAT IS AT STAKE?
In the current political milieu, society is even more stratified and divided than
ever before. With growing income inequality, the gap between the rich and the poor (and
the working poor and working-class) is growing ever wider. Likewise, political stances at
this time feel more polarized than ever—grid locks, government shutdowns, and failures
to make progress on important legislature and policy confirms this (Thomsen). The
carnage of the 2016 presidential election cycle does as well.
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Donald Trump capitalized on a slew of anxieties made from an amalgamation of
economic problems, worries over immigration, racial tension, and more, but he also
tapped into a wound inflicted by a history of class domination manifesting through
classism and elitism. It is a classism that utilizes ableist rhetoric to suggest that white
working-class men are too stupid to know what they are talking about. Betsy LeondarWright reminds progressives that if they want to understand Trump voters and, more
importantly, if they want to change them, the first place to start is by acknowledging that
they are “sane people of normal intelligence who hold a different ideology.”
Pathologizing and insulting the intelligence of those with whom one disagrees is not a
recipe for progress. There will be people who will not change, confirmation bias is hard
to avoid. There will be people filled with hate, and for some it is not safe to try and
change the mind of a Trump voter. This is understandable. But for those in positions of
epistemic authority, those with class privilege or white privilege, these positions of
institutional power must be used in a class-sensitive manner to reach individuals who
have been alienated from progressive politics, that is, if progressives want to see a change
in today’s political climate.
Hochschild voices the need to tear down empathy walls and create empathy
bridges, and Williams, recognizing that empathy might be felt as condescension,
maintains that we still need to try. This involves academics and intellectuals recognizing
the class-biases that their work as academics and actions as people help to uphold. It
involves making a conscious effort to be critical of one’s self. This involves academics
and intellectuals taking inventory of their political and academic beliefs and asking
themselves if they are demonstrating a stance based off of obligation for the sake of a
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professional identity, or if they whole-heartedly care about inclusion. They will need to
think about who they are still excluding. This requires recognizing that people are all at
different places in their learning and that so many people are not “irredeemable.”
If progressives truly do want to bring about social justice for everyone, regardless
of their gender, sex, sexuality, race, country of origin, ability, religion, or class, then this
requires class-sensitive approaches in their social, political, and personal lives, as well as
class-sensitive pedagogies in the classroom. This also requires valuing concrete
experiences and recognizing the importance in developing an ethics of care and personal
accountability (P.H. Collins). In the remainder of this chapter, I will discuss some of
these class-sensitive approaches, the ethics of care and personal accountability, and future
directions for research in this area of study.

A WAY FORWARD?
To be “class-sensitive” is to take part in “thought and action grounded in the goal
of eliminating classism and class bias of all kinds” (Jones and Vagle 130). Describing
class-sensitive pedagogy, Stephanie Jones and Mark Vagle explain that it is
not necessarily about taking up a particular orientation toward the world, but
more about acquiring bodied habits of “judging” our judgments so they do not
continually take hold of us . . . and lead us to making classed reactionary
comments—and speaking out with urgency in solidarity (not sympathy or pity or
hatred) with working-class and poor students. It is about acquiring and sharing
ever-widening knowledge about history and contemporary issues facing families
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struggling to survive and acting with great humility to hear a personal story that
may contradict all of the knowledge learned in books. (138)
What is interesting about this description of class-sensitive pedagogy is its emphasis on
bodied knowledge and ultimately being about acquiring bodied habits of being critical of
our own judgments. This description acknowledges both the validity of the knowledge of
personal, embodied experience, and “the knowledge learned in books,” as well as how
both of these knowledges are simultaneously constitutive of and constituted by social life
(138). These bodied habits help in the development of “class-sensitive perceptivity”
(135). Class-sensitive perceptivity is important for both pedagogues and people in
general. Jones and Vagle explain that this perceptivity involves continually developing an
attunement to moment-to-moment interactions, noting the ways in which spaces are
classed, and recognizing how our bodies exist within these classed spaces in order to
transform “perceived, embodied classism” (135).
For intellectuals and academics, particularly those in gender and sexuality studies
or who espouse feminist stances in their work, classroom, or institutions, it is particularly
imperative to consider how one conceives of those with whom they disagree or how one
interacts with those who do not know the nuanced ways of navigating politically correct
speech. This involves recognizing, as Rosalind Coward asserts, that not every critique of
masculinity is necessarily progressive, noting that, so often, working-class men
disproportionately shoulder the burden of every negative masculine trait or behavior,
while men from the middle and upper-classes, who also benefit from male dominance,
and are often just as guilty of similar behaviors, are able to escape the same level of
criticism. One reason for this is that men with class privilege are more likely to have

74

access to euphemistic forms of language that render their speech more socially
acceptable, and their sexism more covert (Charlesworth). However, this double standard
is ultimately classist in nature and, as Coward argues, perpetuated by a “quasi-feminist
critique of masculinity” (Quoted in Charlesworth 156). While many aspects of
masculinity are worthy of disparagement, Coward maintains, it becomes problematic
when paired with hostility towards the underclasses and underprivileged, or in other
words, when “the disparagement of all things male is linked to the poor” (Quoted in
Charlesworth 156).
This quasi-feminist critique of masculinity has penetrated academic culture
(Charlesworth 161). Thus, while the increased role feminism has played in academic
culture is not entirely responsible for a “demand for the highly euphemized, hypercoherent discourse of political correctness,” it is an important influencing aspect that has
been contorted to foster attitudes that are “often thinly veiled justifications of
class[ism]”(300). Ann Curhoys, identifying the error in speaking of men and women in
ways undifferentiated by class, compellingly critiques this under-acknowledged position
of class privilege:
How had [women who are highly privileged academics] come to identify the
relative privilege and power of the middle-class men they combated in their
working lives with the position of all men? . . . As long as middle class women
identify themselves as the oppressed, they have a theoretical basis for continuing
to exert class privilege. . . And for Socialists, Marxists, this just won’t do . . . to
focus on sexism out of context, to remain willfully blind to the realities of class
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privilege and exploitation in this way, we must locate a class-blind feminism as
politically reactionary. (157)
Intellectuals and academics must be aware of the diverse classed relations to education,
and how the internalized shame working-class people generally experience with
education has helped foster a sense of resentment towards those who symbolically
represent epistemic privilege. Neoliberal discourses of perpetual self-improvement that
preach continued upward mobility in status and income are a part of schools today, but
this type of discourse constructs classist hierarchies and suggests that some workers are
worthy of much less than others (Jones and Vagle). Such discourses often result in
internalized shame for working-class and poor students (Jones and Vagle).
Finally, class-sensitivity is necessary outside of the academic setting as well.
Especially since I have argued that intelligence is a part of everyday life and comes in
many forms other than what is generally already socially and institutionally legitimized.
The process of being self-critical, admitting privilege, and acknowledging the ways in
which practices might be exclusionary to some groups, or might even be perceived as
hostile to some groups is a difficult, but necessary undertaking. Paulo Freire recommends
a collaborative process, between members of the dominant and non-dominant classes, to
examine how class oppression functions. This approach is challenging because it begins
the process of renegotiating the distribution of status, power, and resources, but this is an
important stage in the process towards social justice (Freire; Newton).
Taking inspiration from Patricia Hill Collins, a path forward might be found in the
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primary dimensions of Black Feminist Standpoint Theory12. These dimensions include
valuing the meaning derived from concrete experience and developing both an ethics of
care and of personal accountability (P.H. Collins). An ethics of care involves an emphasis
on the value of each individual, the interconnectedness of emotion and reason, and the
developing of a capacity for empathy and compassion (P.H. Collins). However, with this
ethic of care comes the ethic of personal accountability, the idea that one must be
accountable for the knowledge claims that they make (P.H. Collins). There is a level of
accountability that all people must have and answer for, regardless of their class or other
facets of personal identity, especially when one espouses destructive and otherwise
problematic claims regarding others. Perhaps a greater emphasis on class-sensitivity, an
ethic of care, and an ethic of personal accountability could help to foster a greater
empathy that would branch outward to other facets of social and political life, promoting
systemic change towards social justice for other marginalized groups. Most important is
each individual’s active-participation in dialogue, an intrinsic aspect of coalition building
(P.H. Collins). Through dialogue and the context of community, “people become more
human and empowered” (261). By seeing the human in others, even those with whom
one disagrees with politically or differs from entirely in terms of identity, the “scaffolding
of an empathy bridge” might begin to take form (Hochschild vi).

12

I understand the potential implications of using Black Feminist thought to explain the value of white
working class men’s experiences, however, I believe that the contours of Black Feminist thought can be
adapted across race and incorporated into work with other marginalized groups. In fact, Patricia Hill
Collins states that “the significance of a Black feminist epistemology may lie in its ability to enrich our
understanding of how subordinate groups create knowledge that fosters both their empowerment and social
justice” (269). Therefore, I think it is possible to work with these ideas, even if they are used in application
to white working class men, and still give the Black Feminist origins of these thoughts the respect they
deserve.
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CONCLUSION
In this thesis, I have illustrated how epistemic injustice functions in the divide
between white working-class men and the educated elite by discussing the discursive
ways in which working-class knowledge and experience are devalued as legitimate
sources of knowledge. I demonstrated this by using critical discourse analysis to interpret
the underlying attitudes and ideologies in comments made by Hillary Clinton and Donald
Trump during their 2016 presidential campaigns. I also discussed how these ideologies
are perceived positively or negatively by Trump’s working-class base—whether they
appealed to the working-class or reinforced epistemic injustice by insulting their
intelligence. Using feminist standpoint theory and phenomenology as a foundation of
thought, I claimed that white working-class men are increasingly alienated from
progressive politics through classist and ableist rhetoric and that if progressives wish to
win over white working-class men, they will need to ameliorate this division, otherwise
this gap will continue to grow.
In this final chapter, I have provided a reflection for considering a path forward
using class-sensitive approaches, both in and out of academic settings, and have
considered the applicability of adapting dimensions of Black Feminist thought, put
forward by Patricia Hill Collins, to the experiences of white working-class men. I believe
this is the most feasible route for ameliorating a divide between white working-class men
and the educated elite, a divide which has proven difficult to bridge for the Democratic
Party and progressive politics in general. The three primary dimensions of Black
Feminist Standpoint Epistemology, valuing concrete experience, the ethic of care, and the
ethic of personal accountability, is promising for seeking to bridge this gap because it
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challenges the established methods of knowledge validation that have been used to deny
the validity of the experiences and knowledge of marginalized groups (P.H. Collins). It
calls into question the perspectives of the educated elite and the factors they use for
determining the validity of knowledge. This requires reflexivity in the Bourdieusian
sense, involving “a turning back upon the position of the knowing subject, a looking back
at one's own knowing practice,” from both the dominant classes and the white workingclass (Charlesworth 31).
The ethic of care and personal accountability are also particularly appropriate for
the issues addressed here (P.H. Collins). The ethic of personal accountability holds both
the dominant classes and the white working-class responsible for the knowledge claims
they make. This is crucial because it acknowledges that this argument for valuing the
knowledge and experience of white working-class men is not in any way ignoring or
excusing racist, sexist, and homophobic rhetoric. This accountability also holds elite
educated people responsible for their classist and ableist rhetoric that occurs in resorting
to calling into question the intelligence of white working-class men. But with this
accountability comes the balance of empathy and care, the value of emotion, dialogue,
and connection. These compassionate connections work to validate knowledge claims
and lead us collectively to truth (P.H. Collins).
These ideas are not far from the “empathy bridges” Hochschild urges the educated
elite to build, nor the culture of the “disciplined self” Lamont identified among workingclass men. Working-class ideals value the responsibility to care for others, to be honest,
to recognize the dignity and respect owed to each individual (Lamont et al.). Translating
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these ideals to an ethics of care and personal accountability is possible, and it will take
work, but it is work both working-class people and the dominant classes are capable of.
Future research might consider interviewing white working-class men to gain
insight on their perspectives regarding knowledge, intelligence, and how they see
themselves either fitting or not fitting in to progressive politics. It would be interesting to
inquire about how they understand intelligence and who they consider intelligent, or if
they have traits or skills that they believe should be characterized as intelligent. This
could be helpful for understanding the extent to which they have internalized classist
beliefs of epistemic credibility and it could help generate conversation for expanding
what is conceived of as intelligence. Hearing their own accounts could be very fruitful
terrain for conducting a critical discourse analysis. Of course, it takes an experienced and
perceptive researcher to conduct this type of fieldwork. Other research might include a
look into Democratic strategies for appealing to the white working-class demographic in
future presidential elections. This could include analyzing the speech patterns of
candidates who are more successful with the demographic to understand which discursive
trends resonate most.
Studying white working-class men as individuals and as a demographic, through a
lens of empathy and awareness of the ways in which privilege is intersectional,
recognizing individuals in their multi-faceted identities, and understanding how these
identities relate to systems of power to simultaneously privilege and marginalize people
in different ways is critical for feminist research. Honest and careful effort to bridge the
gap between white working-class men and the educated elite is of great importance in this
political moment. We need a class-sensitive feminism just as much as we need a feminist
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movement that takes into consideration race, ethnicity, sexuality, ability, and so forth. My
hope is that in this thesis I have demonstrated the significance of these points and
continued a discussion that we should be having so we can understand and see the worth
in one another.

81

APPENDIX A
FULL TRANSCRIPT OF CLINTON’S SPEECH AT THE LGBT FOR HILLARY
GALA ON SEPTEMBER 9, 2016 (Reilly)
Thank you all so much. Wow. Thank you. Thank you. It’s sort of like the seventh
inning stretch. Thank you all. You know, I’ve been saying at events like this lately, I am
all that stands between you and the apocalypse. Tonight, I’m all that stands between a
much better outcome! I want to thank Laverne for being here at her first political event.
Her endorsement, her strong words, her passion, her example, her advocacy on behalf of
the transgender community, particularly transgender women of color, is just so
extraordinary, and I love the way she wove in so many of the issues that are up for grabs
in this election. I think we know what we’re up against. We do, don’t we?
[Crowd chants: Yes!]
Donald Trump has pledged for appoint Supreme Court justices who will overturn
marriage equality—
[boos]
And if you have read about the ones he says he’s likely to support, he’s not kidding. In
fact, if you look at his running mate, his running-mate signed a law that would have
allowed businesses to discriminate against LGBT Americans. And there’s so much more
than I find deplorable in his campaign: the way that he cozies up to white supremacist,
makes racist attacks, calls women pigs, mocks people with disabilities — you can’t make
this up. He wants to round up and deport 16 million people, calls our military a disaster.
And every day he says something else which I find so personally offensive, but also
dangerous. You know, the idea of our country is so rooted in continuing progress that we
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make together. Our campaign slogan is not just words. We really do believe that we are
stronger together. We really do believe that showing respect and appreciation for one
another lifts us all up.
And it’s a special commitment that I feel to continuing to fight alongside the
LGBT community. Because this is one of the continuing struggles. We’re filled in this
great hall in Cipriani tonight with successful people, raising your glow sticks, thank you
so much for contributing a little bit more to get the campaign over the finish line. But
somewhere right now in this city is a kid has been kicked out of his house. Somewhere
not far from here, maybe a suburb or across state lines, is a young girl who is just not sure
what her future holds because she just doesn’t feel like she’s herself and no one
understands that. Some kid getting off the bus at the Port Authority and somebody’s
waiting to take advantage of that scared but brave kid looking for a different life and a
future that actually belongs to him or her.
We still have a lot of work to do. And if you think of the work we have to do in
our own country, it pales in comparison to the work we have to do around the world. And
I’m grateful that in this room are so many people who have broken down barriers, stood
up to discrimination and bigotry, fought for the rights of everyone. I was in North
Carolina just yesterday and I told them, it’s not only that discrimination is wrong. It’s bad
for business. That state which was led down a pathway of discrimination is seeing the
results — losing jobs, losing the NBA all-star game. Who wants to be associated with a
governor and a legislation who set out to hurt the people they’re supported to be
representing and protecting?
[Cheers]
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In too many places still, LGBT Americans are singled out for harassment and
violence. You can get married on Saturday, post your pictures on Sunday, and get fired
on Monday. That’s why we’ve got to continue the forward march of progress. And we
cannot do it alone. I cannot do it alone. I’m not like Donald Trump who says ‘I alone can
fix it.’ I’ve never quite figure out what it is he alone can fix.
[Laughter/cheers]
But that’s not what you’ll hear from me. I think we have to do this together. So,
together we’re gonna pass the Equality Act to guarantee full equality. We’re going to put
comprehensive quality affordable health care within reach for more people, including for
mental health and addiction. We’re gonna take on youth homelessness, and as my
wonderful, extraordinary, great daughter said, we are going to end the cruel and
dangerous practice of conversion therapy. We’re going to keep working toward an AIDSfree generation, a goal that I set as secretary of state, and with your help we’re going to
pass comprehensive gun laws…
[HILL-A-RY chants]
I know there are only 60 days left to make our case — and don’t get complacent,
don’t see the latest outrageous, offensive, inappropriate comment and think well he’s
done this time. We are living in a volatile political environment. You know, to just be
grossly generalistic, you could put half of Trump’s supporters into what I call the basket
of deplorables. Right?
[Laughter/applause]
The racist, sexist, homophobic, xenophobic, Islamaphobic — you name it. And
unfortunately there are people like that. And he has lifted them up. He has given voice to
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their websites that used to only have 11,000 people — now have 11 million. He tweets
and retweets their offensive hateful mean-spirited rhetoric. Now, some of those folks —
they are irredeemable, but thankfully they are not America. But the other basket — and I
know this because I see friends from all over America here — I see friends from Florida
and Georgia and South Carolina and Texas — as well as, you know, New York and
California — but that other basket of people are people who feel that the government has
let them down, the economy has let them down, nobody cares about them, nobody
worries about what happens to their lives and their futures, and they’re just desperate for
change. It doesn’t really even matter where it comes from. They don’t buy everything he
says, but he seems to hold out some hope that their lives will be different. They won’t
wake up and see their jobs disappear, lose a kid to heroine, feel like they’re in a dead-end.
Those are people we have to understand and empathize with as well.
[Applause]
And what I hope is that in addition to your extraordinary generosity, you will go
to our website, hillaryclinton.com, or text join to JOIN at 47246 to see how else you can
get involved. And I want to echo what Chelsea said. We are trying to register 3 million
more voters and get those voters to commit to vote. We will win if people turn out to
vote. There is no doubt in my mind that we will win.
[Cheers]
But we can’t take anyone or any place for granted. And therefore I am asking you to
volunteer for a phone bank, for a canvas — at the very least if you know anybody who’s
even thinking about voting for Trump, stage an intervention! That may be one conversion
therapy I endorse.
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[Cheers]
Just remember: Friends don’t let friends vote for Trump.
So we’re going to have a great night tonight because we are so blessed. You
know, we all love this woman either from afar or luckily enough up close — and for my
family, it’s been up close. We know she’s the great talent of our time. We know that
remarkably she’s had a number one album in each of the last six decades. We know that.
But we also feel and see her heart and her passion. And she’s of course been a great ally
and supporter of the LGBT community — but of progressive causes and candidates, she’s
been on the front lines repeatedly, bravely, never giving up or giving in to all of the
incoming criticism that any of us who stick our necks out often attract. So we’re in for a
great treat tonight. I could not be happier, more grateful, or excited, than to introduce a
woman of such extraordinary presence, that really just her first name — spelled correctly
— is more than enough. Please welcome, Barbra Streisand!
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APPENDIX B
DONALD TRUMP’S FULL RESPONSE ON SEPTEMBER 12, 2016 IN
ASHVILLE, NORTH CAROLINA (C-SPAN)
Thank you. I am so thrilled to be back in the great state of North Carolina. In 56
days, we are going to win this state -- and we are going to win the White House. But to
do that you must get out and vote, and that means early voting which begins on October
20th.
This is our chance -- our one chance -- to fix our rigged system and create
prosperity for each and every American. Our vision of hope stands in stark contrast to my
opponent's campaign of hate. Hillary Clinton has been running a hate-filled and negative
campaign with no policy, no solutions, and no new ideas. By contrast, I've been going
around the country offering detailed plans for reform. All of these reform plans are
available on our website.
While my opponent slanders you as deplorable and irredeemable, I call you
hardworking American patriots who love your country and want a better future for all of
our people. You are Democrats, Independents and Republicans. Above all else, you are
Americans -- and you are entitled to leadership that honors you, cherishes you and
defends you. Every American is entitled to be treated with dignity and respect in our
country. Whether you vote for me, or whether you vote for someone else, I will be your
champion in the White House.
Hillary Clinton represents only the insiders, the donors and the special interests. I
will be speaking more about Hillary Clinton's disqualifying remarks in a minute, but first
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let me invite onto the stage some people who can tell you themselves what they think of
her spiteful comments.
I have some more thoughts on Clinton's remarks I will be sharing momentarily,
but first I want to tell you what I am going to do to make your life better. We've outlined
a detailed plan on trade, on immigration, on rebuilding the military, on changing our
foreign policy. I've delivered a plan on defeating Islamic terrorism, on reforming our tax
code, on unleashing American energy, and on providing school choice to every
disadvantaged child in America. We've released policy after policy, solution after
solution. Every day, we are putting forward new ideas to make your life better. The
change will start right away, the moment I take my oath of office.
On my first day, we are going to immediately terminate every single
unconstitutional executive order signed by President Obama. Then, I am going to order a
review of every single regulation issued over the last eight years. All needless, job-killing
regulations will be cancelled. Millions of new jobs will come pouring in. We are going to
lift the restriction on American energy -- this will create another half a million new jobs a
year. That's just the beginning. On my first day in office, I am going to ask Congress to
send me a bill to immediately repeal and replace disastrous Obamacare -- this will
instantly save another 2 million jobs. I am also going to propose a massive tax reduction
to unleash prosperity in every city and state in our country. On that first day, I am also
going to instruct the Department of Commerce to immediately begin a review of all
foreign trade practices that unfairly hurt American manufacturing. I will use every lawful
Presidential power to achieve relief for our workers. You can read the full 7-point trade
plan on my website, DonaldJTrump.com.
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North Carolina has lost more than 4 in 10 manufacturing jobs since NAFTA. Bill
Clinton signed it, and Hillary Clinton supported it. Right here in Ashville, you've lost 1 in
5 manufacturing jobs since China joined the World Trade Organization -- another
Hillary-backed deal. Hillary Clinton owes all of you an apology. And I think you'll get
that apology right around the same time Hillary Clinton hands over the 33,000 emails she
deleted. By the way, Hillary Clinton destroyed her emails after she received a
congressional subpoena. They used a special software called bleach bit. She even made
her 13 different phones disappear -- some of them were even destroyed with a hammer.
Hillary Clinton obviously had a whole lot to hide, including her pay-for-play scandals at
Secretary of State. Pay-for-play with UBS, with Russian Uranium, with contracts for her
friends and family in Haiti. Nothing is so dangerous to American Democracy as when a
public official puts their federal office up for sale. Hillary Clinton believes she is above
the law.
She also believes that she is above all of you. After months of hiding from the
press, Hillary Clinton came out and finally told the world how she feels about the people
of this country. She said tens of millions of patriotic Americans belong in a "basket of
deplorables." She talks about people like they're objects, not human beings. She said half
of our supporters are not even real Americans, and describes the other half as having run
out of options -- what she can't understand or accept is that the great majority of this
country now sees right through the lies and deceptions of a failed political establishment.
They want change, they want justice, and they want a government that puts the American
people first.
Whether our supporters have lost a job to a factory moved to another country, or
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whether they're a captain in the police department, or a teacher at a local school, they are
united by their deep and sophisticated understanding of how our political system has
abandoned the people. For those who have been hit by hard times, they understand better
than anyone that it's Hillary Clinton's Wall Street agenda that has crushed the middle
class of this country.
Hillary Clinton spoke with hatred in her heart for these working class Americans.
She looks down on them -- she looks down on all the people who make her life possible.
She looks down on the carpenters, plumbers, electricians, lawyers and accountants. She
looks down on the police officers, soldiers, and firefighters supporting our campaign. She
looks down on the people who cook her meals, drive her cars, and dig the coal that
powers her electricity. She called these Americans every name in the book -- racist,
sexist, xenophobic, Islamophobic -- she said they were not even American.
Never in history has a major-party presidential candidate so viciously demonized
the American voter. She was attacking millions of moms and dads who love their
children and want a better future for all Americans. What should these parents tell their
children about Hillary Clinton's attacks? To every kid in America tonight, I want you to
know: your parents are working so hard to make your life better, and to make your
country better -- and if I get the chance, I will fight right alongside them to deliver a
better future for everyone. Clinton made her remarks at a high-dollar fundraiser in Wall
Street. Her goal is simple: to bully the American voter out of voting for change. The
people who rigged the system want to keep things exactly as they are. They want to keep
our terrible trade deals. They want to trap children in failing government schools. They
want massive regulation to keep small businesses from being able to compete. Hillary
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Clinton can never be President of this country. No one who has such a low opinion of the
American people can ever be elected as their President.
Earlier today I had a chance to spend some time with some more of our most
amazing Americans. I spent the afternoon with the National Guard Association of the
United States. These are the heroes who rescue our people in disasters, and who fight our
wars. These heroes are a permanent testament to the courage and character of our nation.
We also honor and remember the lives of the service members who have made the
ultimate sacrifice. There is no greater love than the love shown by the men and women
who have laid down their lives for this country and its people. Our debt to them is eternal
and everlasting. One thing that we must do is to ensure that our men and women in
uniform have the best equipment, resources and tools in the world. We must provide
them the best medical care while they serve, and the best medical care when they return
home to civilian life. The Veterans scandals that have occurred under this Administration
-- and that have been dismissed by my opponent -- are a permanent stain on this
government. It's just one more way Hillary Clinton only looks out for herself.
We must take care of our Veterans. That includes giving Veterans the right to
choose treatment at either a public VA facility, or the private doctor of their choice. Just
today we learned that the VA has violated a federal law by failing to make its
performance records available to consumers. The scandals never seem to end -- but they
will, when I'm elected President.
Nothing makes me more proud than to have the support of the men and women
who hear the uniform. We've received endorsements from 120 generals and admirals,
these are the people who know how to keep our country safe. Just today, I was
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profoundly humbled to gain the endorsement of 14 Medal of Honor recipients. I can't
even begin to say how much it means to me to have the support of these intrepid heroes.
Also, today, I was thrilled to announce that Ambassador R. James Woolsey, former head
of the CIA, is now a senior advisor to our campaign.
We are on a mission of change. That includes a new agenda for our inner cities.
The Democratic Party has run the inner cities for fifty, sixty, seventy years and more. 4 in
10 African-American children live in poverty, including 45% of those under the age of
six. 2,900 people have been shot in Chicago since the beginning of the year. For those
suffering and hurting, I say: give Donald J. Trump a chance. I will fix it. What do you
have to lose? Let me also tell you what you have to gain: millions of new jobs, higher
wages, and amazing schools. I will fight for Detroit, for Chicago, for Baltimore, and for
every neglected part of this nation -- and I will fight to bring us all together as One
American People. Imagine what our country could accomplish if we started working
together as One People, under One God, saluting One American Flag.
It is time to break with the bitter failures of the past, and to embrace a New
American Future. In this future, we will respect the dignity of all Americans -- and that
means great jobs, great schools, and great neighborhoods. We will keep our children safe
-- which includes steadfast support for American law enforcement. Jobs will return,
prosperity will rise, and new factories will come rushing back to our shores. Government
corruption will end. Honesty will be restored. Republicans are the Party of Abraham
Lincoln and, come November 8th, we will once again have a government of, by and for
the people. We Will Make America Prosperous Again. We Will Make America Safe
Again. And Will Make America Great Again. Thank you, and God Bless!
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